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This article analyses the criminalization provisions of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the backbone of the legal regime for the prevention of 
terrorist financing. It makes a detailed examination of the background of the Convention and the 
nature of the negotiation discussions that led to its adoption. The drafters of the Convention were 
faced with two problems: first, how to define terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist groups, the 
financing of which was the subject matter; second, the precise scope of the offence, in particular, how 
to define the preparatory acts of financing as an independent offence. This article argues that the 
definition of the offence provided by the Convention is far too ambiguous and its application at 
national levels can often lead to an unjustifiable and unfair criminal law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The creation of a comprehensive and international counter-terrorism financing regime has 
been drawn from the idea that cutting off terrorist funds could slow down, disturb and 
dismantle terrorist networks, which is similar to the ideas driving international measures 
against organized crime and money laundering. On a practical level, two international 
organizations (namely the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force, hereinafter 
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the FATF) created and perpetuate a system of measures to prohibit acts of financing, freeze 
terrorist funds and track down terrorists. After the 9/11 attacks, substantial efforts have been 
made to assure that countries have adopted and implemented laws consistent with these 
measures. However, there appears that these measures have been subject to relatively little 
critical scrutiny, and there has been little debate about whether these measures are 
proportionate to their potential effectiveness.  
This article analyses the criminalization provisions of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1  the backbone of the legal regime for the 
prevention of terrorist financing. It makes a detailed examination of the background of the 
Convention and the nature of the negotiation discussions that led to its adoption. The drafters 
of the Convention encountered two main problems: first, how to define terrorism, terrorist 
acts, terrorise purposes and terrorist groups, the financing of which would be criminalized; 
second, the precise scope of the offence, in particular, how to define the preparatory acts of 
financing as an independent offence. This article argues that the definition of the offence 
provided by the Convention is far too ambiguous and its application at national levels can 
often lead to an unjustifiable and unfair criminal law.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EFFORTS TO ADOPT A CONVENTION ON 
TERRORIST FINANCING 
It is hard to determine when and how the idea developed that drying up terrorist funds should 
become a central element in the fight against terrorism.2 But it seems that a call for the 
adoption of measures to counter terrorist financing was officially issued in G7/8 ministerial 
meetings where it was agreed “to peruse measures aimed at depriving terrorists of their 
sources of finance”.3 Following the G8’s statement of its interest in depriving terrorism of 
funding, on December 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 51/210, 
establishing an ad hoc committee to “address means of further developing a comprehensive 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 United Nations The International Convention for the Suprresion of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 
December 1999). 
2  Michael Levi “Combating the financing of terrorism: a history and assessment of the control of ‘threat 
finance’” 2010 50(4) British Journal of Criminology, at 666. 
3 G7 Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism (December 12, 1995). See also G7 Ministerial 
Conference on Terrorism (Paris, July 30, 1996). The role of G8 in the fight against terrorism is significant, as its 
members declared that “we are determined as a group to continue to provide leadership on this issue to the 
international community, using bilateral and multilateral measures and agreements to counter terrorism”.   For 
more information about the role of the G8 in the fight against terrorism, see Andre Belelieu “The G8 and 
terrorism: what role can the G8 play in the 21st century?” June 2002 No. 8 G8 Governance. 
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legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism”. 4  Using identical 
wording to that used in the G7/8 Agreement on 25 Measures for Combating Terrorism made 
in July 1996, the Resolution, also, called on all States to take steps to counteract terrorist 
financing.5  
In the fall of 1998, a draft of a convention on the suppression of the financing of 
terrorism6, a French initiative at a G8 summit,7 was proposed to the United Nations. By the 
requirement of the UN General Assembly,8 the draft was considered at a meeting of an ad 
hoc committee9 and then a Working Group of the Sixth Committee10. After an evaluation, the 
Sixth Committee recommended that the General Assembly adopt the proposed convention.11 
On 9 December1999, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (hereinafter the Terrorist Financing Convention) was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly and regarded as a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism.12  
In general, the Convention followed the structure and standard provisions of its previous 
counter-terrorism conventions particularly the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombing (hereinafter the Terrorist Bombing Convention).13 The notable example 
is Article 3 of the Terrorist Financing Convention, which limits its application to the cases 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), A/RES/51/210, 17 December 1996, para. 9.  
5 Compare paragraph 19 of G7 Ministerial Conference on Terrorism (Paris, July 30, 1996) with paragraph 3(f) 
of the UNGA Resolution, id. Both with the same wording called on all states to “take steps to prevent and 
counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations, 
whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, 
social or cultural goals or which are also engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drug 
dealing and racketeering”. The Resolution additionally emphasized on the prevention of “the exploitation of 
persons for purposes of funding terrorist activities, and in particular to consider, where appropriate, adopting 
regulatory measures to prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended for terrorist 
purposes without impeding in any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements and to intensify the 
exchange of information concerning international movements of such funds”. 
6 UN Doc Letter dated 3 November 1998 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-general ( A/C.6/53/9,4 November 1998). 
7 G8 Foreign Ministers' Progress Report: Denver Summit of the Eight (Denver, June 21, 1997). For more details 
on the French initiative at the Denver summit see Andre Belelieu “The G8 and terrorism: what role can the G8 
play in the 21st century?” June 2002 No. 8 G8 Governance. < http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/governance/ >; 
Michele Fratianni New perspectives on global governance : why America needs the G8 (Ashgate, Aldershot, 
2005). 
8 UN, A/RES/53/108, 26 January 1998, para.12. 
9 UN, A/54/37, 15 to26 March 1999. 
10 UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, 27 September to 8 October 1999. 
11UN, A/54/615. 
12 UN, A/54/PV.76; A/RES/54/109, 9 December 1999. 
13 UN, A/52/653, 25 November 1997. For more details see Clifton Johnson, “Introductory note to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism” 2000 39 International Legal 
Materials 268, at 268. 
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involved with a transnational element.14 The Convention is also inapplicable to a situation 
involving armed conflict, because such situations are addressed by international humanitarian 
law.15 Similar to the Terrorist Bombing Convention, Article 20 and 22 of the Convention 
emphasizes that it must be applied “in a manner consistence with the principles of sovereign 
equality and territorial integrity of States, and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs 
of other States”.16   
The Convention provided a list of measures directed at terrorist financing, many of which 
were drawn from the 40 anti-money laundering recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force (hereinafter the FATF17).18 It is not surprising that the United Nations, under the 
influence of G7/8 which conceived of the idea of counter-terrorist financing, adopted  such an 
approach as since early in the 1990s, it had continuously emphasised the possible link 
between terrorism and organized crime, particularly drug trafficking.19  
The drafters were confronted were with a difficult problem. In order to criminalize 
terrorist financing, they first had to overcome the hurdle of the lack of consensus on the 
definition of terrorism. Creating the nature and defining the scope of new offence were the 
“main” and “unusual” problems the drafters were faced.20  
II. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT OF 
TERRORISM21 
Logically, without defining terrorism, terrorist offences or terrorist groups, it is impossible to 
address terrorist financing. Nonetheless, there are some peculiarities about the nature of 
terrorism which has made not only all attempts to reach an agreement on the definition of 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
14 This is similar to  Article 3 of The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 17 
December 1979), Article 4 (4) of The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation  (Montreal, 23 September 1971), Article 4 of The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation  (Rome, 10 March 1988). 
15 Article 2 (b). This is identical to Article 12 of the The International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages and  Article 19 of  International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing.  
16 This is similar to Article 17 and 18 Terrorist Bombing Convention.  
17 The FATF is an inter-governmental body established by the G7/8 in 1989 to counter money laundering. 
18 Johnson, supra note13, at 269. 
19 For example see UNGA, A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994. Or see UN Doc, A/CONF 157/23, 12 July 1993. 
Or see UN, Second session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, A/AC 254/4 Rev 1, 10 February 1999.  
20 Anthony Aust “Counter-terrorism_new approach: the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism” 2001 5 Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law 285,at 286 
21 Discussions in this part have been separately and independently addressed and published in the Journal of 
Financial Crime. See Hamed Tofangsaz “Terrorism or not terrorism? Whose money are we looking for?” 2015 
22(3) Journal of Financial Crime.  
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terrorism, until now, impossible, but also the criminalization of terrorist financing 
controversial. That is, there is no agreement on what types of conduct, in what circumstances 
and when, against whom (targets or victims) and with what intention or motivation constitute 
terrorism.   
In terms of the objective element, the actus reus of the offence of terrorism is defined by 
scholars as the “underlying act” which is an offence in itself: murder, hijacking, kidnapping 
and so on. 22  The less-discussed question is whether the underlying act of terrorism 
encompasses any unlawful conducts, including violent ones, “repressive acts” 23 and even 
minor criminal conduct like vandalism? While some believe that the underlying acts of 
terrorism only (need to) include serious offences or “violence”, 24 in providing a generic 
definition on terrorism, some regional agreements include “any act which is a violation of the 
criminal laws of a State Party”. 25 This seems to cover all criminal conducts. A UN draft 
Convention against Terrorism enumerates the underlying act of causing “death or serious 
bodily injury …, serious damage to public or private property … resulting or likely to result 
in major economic loss”.26 The question can be also raised whether a lawful conduct which 
may terrorise people can be an underlying act?    
The most peculiar feature of terrorism, as the famous dictum ‘one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter’ indicates, is that “the same kind of action … will be described 
differently by different observers, depending on when and where it took place and whose side 
the observer is on”.27 That is, terrorism, unlike other transnational crimes, is not such act 
inherently and always recognized as criminal. Its criminality can be circumstantial. There are 
some circumstances, such as struggles for self-determination, attempts at national liberation, 
rebellion and duress or necessity, on which there is no agreement whether terrorist-type of 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
22 Robert Cryer An Introduction to international criminal law and procedure (2nd ed, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010), at 289. Ben Saul Defining terrorism in international law Oxford monographs in 
international law (Oxford University Press,  2006), at 59.  
23 Proposed by the Non-Aligned Group of Ad Hoc Committee (UN, A/RES/3034(XXVII), 18 December 1972) 
reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni and International Institute for Advanced Criminal Science International 
terrorism and political crimes (Thomas, Springfield, 1974), at 564.  
24Report of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Mission to Spain, UN, A/HRC/10/3 Add.2, 16 December 2008, para 6. See also  
Cryer, supra note 22, at 289.  
25  Article 1 (3) of Organization of African Unity OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism (14 June 1999). See also article 1 (2) of League of Arab States Arab Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism (Cairo, 22 April 1998). Article 1 (2) of Organization of the Islamic Conference Convention of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism (1 July 1999). 
26 UN, Draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism, A/59/894, (12 August 2005), Article 
2.  
27 Jenny  Teichman “Terrorism” in C. A. Gearty (ed) Terrorism (Dartmouth, Aldershot, England, 1996), at 5. 
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conduct or the use of violence are unlawful and unjustifiable but excusable, or unlawful but 
justifiable, or even lawful.28 Although these circumstances might be regarded as exceptional,  
ambivalence about the use of terrorism in these circumstances has plagued agreement on a 
generic definition of terrorism. 29  In some regional agreements, however, some of these 
circumstances have been taken into account by being exempted from the definition of 
terrorism.30 Nonetheless, what law should govern such exempted acts31, or whether these acts 
ought to be covered by the international humanitarian law or the “law of international 
criminal defences” has not been clarified either regionally or internationally.32  
To solve the problem of how to label terrorist-type conducts, especially in those 
exceptional circumstances named, one may assume that specifying the targets or victims of 
terrorism can help to identify which acts constitute terrorism. But, the peculiarity of terrorism 
also confuses the recognition of the targets of terrorism. Terrorism is a “compound offence” 
which needs both a mens rea in relations to its underlying act and a special intent in regard to 
the terrorism itself. So, there are two types of victims: the target of the underlying act and the 
“real target” at which the underlying act has been aimed.33  
With regard to the targets of the underlying offence, there is a critical controversy about 
whether acts against non-human targets can be labelled as terrorism. A “British-inspired 
definition of terrorism”34 includes various forms of damage to property and interference with 
or disruption of essential utilities and infrastructure. 35  Others restrict this definition by 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
28See the debates in UN, Ad Hoc Committee Report (1937), A/9028; Or UN, Ad Hoc Committee Report (1977), 
A/34/39. Antonio Cassese Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal Hersch Lauterpacht memorial 
lectures ([1st ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), at 152-152. M. Cherif Bassiouni International 
terrorism and political crimes (Thomas, Springfield, 1975). Georges Sorel Reflections on violence (Collier 
Books, New York, London, 1961). Ted Honderich After the terror (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
2003), at 151, 170 and 184-185. 
29 Neil Boister An introduction to transnational criminal law (1st ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 
2012), at 63. 
30  Article 3(1) of Organization of African Unity OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism excempts “the struggle waged  by peoples … for their liberation or self-determination, including 
armed struggle against colonalism, occupation, aggression and dominion by foreign forces” from being lablled 
as terrorst acts.  See also Article 2(a) of League of Arab States Arab Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism. Article 2 (a) of Organization of the Islamic Conference Convention of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism.  
31 For more details about the countries’ positions on this issue see Cassese, Antonio Cassese International 
criminal law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2008), at 167 and 168.  
32 Saul, supra note 22, at 128. 
33 Cryer, supra note 22, at 290. 
34 Kent Roach “The case for defining terrorism with restraint and without reference to political or religious 
motive” in Andrew Lynch, George Williams, and Edwina MacDonald (eds) Law and liberty in the war on 
terror (Federation Press, Annandale, N.S.W., 2007), 252 , at 40. 
35 See for example  section 1 (2)(b),(e)  Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) or section 100.1(2)(b) of Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Australia) 
7 
 
requiring that such property damage needs to be “likely to endanger human life”.36 In some 
regional agreements, an act falls within the scope of terrorism if it is taken with the intention 
of destabilizing or destroying “the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structure of a country or an international organization”.37 Although the property damage 
element is included in the UN Draft Convention definition of terrorist acts,38  it is neither in 
the list of the acts drawn by the Resolution 1566 of the Security Council on the condemnation 
of terrorism, 39  nor consistent with the meaning of terrorism advocated by the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism. 40  The concern is expressed that while such inclusion can capture 
conduct of a terrorist nature, it is likely to target “conduct with no bearing at all to 
terrorism”.41  A protest against the WTO, for instance, would be a terrorist act if it resulted in 
property damage.42 
With regard to the special intent of terrorism, the League of Nations in a failed attempt 
regarded terrorism as a criminal act with the intention of creating “a state of terror in the 
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public”.43 In this definition, 
it is not clear whether intimidation is the primary purpose of the terrorists or whether it is a 
means for an ulterior end. A number of recent definitions broaden the element by requiring 
that the purpose of an act of terrorism must be “to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.44 The 
difficulty is that it is not clear what degree of intimidation or compulsion needs to occur for 
an act to be considered terrorism: 45  mere intimidation 46  or serious intimidation? 47   In 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
36 Section 5(3) (d) of Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (NZ). 
37 Article 1(1) of  EU Council, Framework on Combating Terrorism, (2002/475/JHA). See also Article 1 (2) of 
Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. 
38 Article 2(b), (c) of UN, Draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism, A/59/894, (12 
August 2005).  
39  UN, S/Res/1566 (2004). The Resolution defines terrorism as “criminal acts, including against civilians, 
committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a 
population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. 
40Martin Scheinin, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; promotion and protection of human rights”, UN, 
E/CN.4/2006/98, 28 December 2005, para 36, 38. 
41 Id. 
42 Cryer, supra note 22, at 291. 
43  Article 1 (2) of The League of Nations,Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
C.546.M383.1937.v. (16 November 1937), ratified only by one state (India). 
44 Article 2(1)(b) of the Terrorist Financing Convention.  
45 Saul, supra note 22, at 60. 
8 
 
addition, the concern has been expressed that none of these elements are easy to prove 
because terrorists do not necessarily make their specific demands or make openly public the 
purpose of their action.48  In the Boston marathon bombings, for example, it has not been 
plainly announced what the perpetrators intended to prompt the US government to do or 
abstain from doing.     
What complicates defining the subjective element of terrorism is the question whether 
intimidation of the public or coercion of a State constitutes terrorism if it is motivated by 
personal impulses or by material gain such as in blackmail, extortion, revenge or personal 
hatred?  While some propose that even acts of violence for personal gain should constitute 
terrorism,49 others exclude any terrorist-type conduct with a private motive from a definition 
of terrorism.50 They argue that “if a definition of terrorism is to reflect the real nature of the 
harm that terrorism inflicts on the political process”, public motives, including political, 
ideological, religious, ethnic, or philosophical motives, must be distinguished from “private 
violence”.51 It is exemplified that setting fire to a building motivated by non-political, non-
religious or non-ideological cannot be regarded as terrorism but arson as a public motive is 
lacking.52 Similarly, an aggravated bank robbery may end with the killing or hostage-taking, 
but if done in order for the bandits to flee unharmed the intimidating of the public and 
coercing the police not to take any action against the bandits cannot be regarded terrorism as 
this action has not be done for advancing an ideological, political or other public cause (there 
are of course a range of common crimes suited to deal with such situations).53             
From a criminal law perspective, it is again controversial whether while motive is 
irrelevant to criminal culpability, the existing criminal law needs to be expanded so as to 
include motive as an element of the crime of terrorism. The proponents of such inclusion 
believe that requiring motive as a mental element “allows the criminal law to more finely 
                                                                                                                                                        
46 Section 1(b) of Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) considers an act as terrorism if it merely influences a government or 
an international organization.  
47 Article 1(1) of EU Council Framework on Combating Terrorism considers an act as terrorism which aims to 
seriously intimidate a population, or unduly compel a government or international organization … or seriously 
destabilize or destroy “the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structure of  a country or an 
international organization”. Or terrorism, in section 89a of German Criminal code, is defined as a “serious 
violent act endangering the state”.  
48 Geoffrey Levitt “Is terrorism worth defining?” 1986 13 Ohio Northern University Law Review 97, at 111. 
49 Non-Aligned group’s proposed definition of acts of terrorism includes “[a]cts of violence committed by 
individuals or groups of individuals for private gain, the effect of which are not confined to one state”. See  UN, 
A/RES/3034(XXVII), 18 December 1972 reprinted in  Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 564.   
50 Cassese, supra note  31, at 169.  
51 Saul, supra note 22, at 61 
52 Cassese, supra note 31, at 168. 
53 Id. 
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target, stigmatise and deter what is considered by society to be especially wrongful about 
terrorism” “which is not inherent in a physical act of violence alone”.54 This may also help 
“satisfy public indignation, better express community condemnation”, “placate popular (but 
reasonable) demands for justice” and “send[s] a symbolic message that certain kinds of 
violence cannot be tolerated in plural, secular democracies”.55  
On the other hand, the opponents to this definition of the offence around the motive of the 
offender insist on retaining as many of the principles of criminal law including the general 
requirement for the proof of fault as possible. 56  Criticizing the inclusion of motive 
requirement imposed by some states,57 they correctly argue that motive should not excuse 
terrorism nor constitute part of the crime of terrorism because such inclusion would result in 
detrimental consequences: infringement of basic human rights such as freedoms of 
conscience, belief, religion, thought, expression and association by targeting and prosecuting 
on political, religious or ideological grounds,58 arousing and disseminating  “suspicion and 
anger” of anyone who seems to belong to a religious, ideological or political group connected 
to a terrorist act, 59  and “ politicizing the investigative and trial process” by requiring 
intelligence agencies and trials to provide extensive evidence about the true meaning of a 
motive by which a terrorist act might be induced. 60  Alternatively, they believe that a 
definition of terrorism will be less controversial and more acceptable if it relies more on the 
essence of terrorism, “namely the intentional murder and maiming of innocent civilians” 
rather than on motive. It is, therefore, thought preferable to concentrate on the physical harm 
caused by terrorist acts and to treat terrorists as ordinary criminals. As a solution, this seems 
deficient as it is not clear what after all is the definition of ‘innocent civilians’ in peacetime or 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
54 Ben Saul “The curious element of motive in definition of terrorism:essential ingredient or criminalizing 
thought?” in Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald, and George Williams (eds) Law and liberty in the war on 
terror (Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 2007), 252, at  29,30.  
55 Id., at 37. 
56 Roach, supra note 34, at 42.  
57 UK in section 1 (1)(c) of Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) defines terrorism as “the use or threat of action made for 
the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause”. See also  section 83.1(1) of Criminal 
Code 1985 (Canada); section 5 of Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (NZ); s 1(1)(xxv) (c) Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 2004 (South Africa); section 100.1 of 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Australia). 
58 R v Khawaja  (2006) 214 C.C.C. (3d) 399, (Ontario Superior Court of Justice) para. 45, 80 and 73. 
59 Id., para. 58. 
60 Irwin  Cotler “Terrorism, security and rights : the dilemma of democracies” in Errol. Mendes and Debra M. 
McAllister (eds) Between crime and war : terrorism, democracy and the constitution (Thomson/Carswel, 
Toronto, 2002), at 35-36. 
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wartime? It is argued by some that the use of violence against non-innocent civilians is 
justified, in what is so-called “terrorism for humanity”.61      
 A. The Terrorist Financing Convention and the Definition of Terrorism 
The impossibility of reaching an agreement on a generic and authoritative definition of 
terrorism led initially to the adoption of a “thematic approach” to condemn and suppress 
terrorist acts.62 Accordingly, international conventions were negotiated on certain classes of 
offences implicitly regarded “terrorist”, without attempting to define or even apply the term 
terrorism or imposing a special intent or motivation. 63  Although setting aside the intent 
element in the favour of “sharply narrowed and highly elaborated” material elements made 
the inclusion of these sectoral conventions possible,64 the criticism has been expressed that 
the acts criminalized by the conventions  miss the unique characteristic of terrorism as these 
agreements implicitly include acts committed for personal and material causes. 65  
Unlike the sectoral conventions, the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention could 
not define the new offence by simply reference to a particular type of act;66 rather, they 
would need to define terrorism, the financing of which the Convention was going to 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
61Ted Honderich and ebrary Inc. After the terror (Expanded, rev. ed, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
2003) at 151,170, 184-185. See also  Ted Honderich Terrorism for humanity : inquiries in political philosophy 
(Pluto Press, London ; Sterling, 2003). The example of terrorism for humanity is Palestinian suicide attacks 
against Israelis which is considered as the only means for realising Palestinians from Israel domination.  
Honderich compares and analogizes Palestinian action with intentionally atomic bombing of innocent in the 
Second World War by the US.      
62Cryer, supra note 22, at 285. 
63 These conventions are : Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague 
on 16 December 1970, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
done at Montreal on 23 September 1971, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 14 December 1973, International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979, Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988, Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988 , 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental 
Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997, International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism New York, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on 13 April 2005       
64 Levitt, supra note 48,  at 101.  
65 Cryer, supra note 22. 
66 Aust, supra note 20, at 291. 
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criminalize. So, the Convention adopted a “two-fold” approach:67 a listing of offences and “a 
mini definition of terrorism”. 68  With regard to the former, the Convention prohibits the 
financing of those acts within the scope of the sectoral conventions and any further ones.69 
With regard to the latter, it was also argued that it was necessary to include a generic 
definition on terrorism for the purpose of the Convention since “not all terrorist offences were 
covered” by the sectoral conventions.70 Despite little pressure to delete the mini-definition,71 
the Convention defined terrorism as an 
act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not 
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of 
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or 
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.72  
Although this definition was endorsed for the purpose of the Convention and for defining a 
new offence of terrorist financing, 73  not all aspects of terrorism are clearly and 
comprehensively reflected in the definition; nor have all those international concerns 
discussed above been properly addressed. First of all, the Convention does not clarify 
whether if it is to be considered terrorism, the use of violence should be only against people 
as the generic definition indicates, or whether an act against property can be terroristic as it is 
inferred from the Convention’s reference to the sectoral conventions, some of which 
criminalise acts against property.74  
The Convention’s identification of people as the victims of terrorism is also not 
compelling since it has been couched in vague terms. Unlike the first draft of the Convention 
which did not even employ the term armed conflict on the grounds that the activities of armed 
forces during an armed conflict are understood under international humanitarian law,75 in a 
revised version of the draft Convention, a provision was added to the definition of terrorism, 
prohibiting “[a]n act designed to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
67 UN, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, A/C.6/54/L.2, 26 October 1999, Annex III, para. 62 
68 Aust, supra note 20, at 291. 
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71 A/C.6/54/L.2, 26 October 1999, Annex III, para. 81. 
72 The Terrorist Financing Convention, Article 2 (1)(b). 
73 Aust, supra note 20, at 298. 
74 For example Article II (1)(b) of Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation covers acts which “destroy[s] or seriously damage[s] the facilities of an 
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75 UN, A/C.6/53/9, 4 November 1998, Article 21 (2)  
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other person, other than in armed conflict … ”.76 The retention of the added provision was 
supported on the understanding that it was necessary for the Convention to cover not only 
civilians but also those who are not civilians “but were not engaged in armed conflict either”, 
such as “off-duty military officers”. 77  However, the comment was made that the added 
provision implied that “civilians did not take part in hostilities, which was considered not to 
be always the case”.78 Instead, it was proposed that the provision be amended to protect any 
person, whether civilians or nor, who is not “taking an active part” in hostilities. Although 
this proposal was not taken into account in reformulating the final draft, the qualifier “not 
taking an active part” was inserted in the definition of terrorism to include “any act intended 
to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an 
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict” within the scope of terrorism.   
Such a reference to armed conflict can be problematic for the following reasons. 
Generally speaking, while the lack of consensus on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use 
of violence in some circumstances of armed conflict such as self-determination or national 
movements is one of the main obstacles to reach a universal agreement on a definition of 
terrorism, the Convention evades the issue. This evasion increases “a possibility of legal 
dispute when the [Convention] is applied to a real case” 79 because some may insist on 
excluding the use of violence in those circumstances from being labelled as terrorism.80 
 In addition, it is not clear what the phrase “any other person not taking an active part in 
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict” excludes from the definition.  This could “give 
rise to disputes of interpretation, i.e., as to whether a particular act constituted terrorism, or 
was undertaken during armed conflict. The United States, for example, interprets this phrase 
to include an assault on off-duty military personnel in time of armed conflict.81 In this regard, 
it might be controversial as to how to deal with combatants of various kinds, either as 
terrorists or combatants. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
76 UN, A/AC.252/L.7 and Corr.1, reproduced in UN, A/54/37, 15 to 26 March 1999, Annex II, Working 
document submitted by France on the draft international convention for the suppression of the financing of 
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78 Id., para. 101. 
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81 United States. President (1993-2001 : Clinton) and United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign 
Relations International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism: message from the President of the 
United States Treaty doc (U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 2000), at VII. 
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It is also significant to note that the Convention is silent on what the definition of 
‘civilian’ is? So, there remains a lot of controversy over the questions of whether Israeli 
settlers in Palestinian occupied lands, Pied-noirs in Algeria or white South Africans in the 
time of apartheid are or were, for instance, ‘innocent civilians’, and whether the use of 
violence against police officers or government officials who implement the oppressive 
policies of a government are terrorism?82  
The attempt of the authors of the Convention to specify the intention or purpose of the 
crime is also subject to criticism for its wideness. According to the definition, it may suffice 
for an act to be classified terroristic if it is determined that the purpose of the act, “by its 
nature or context”, is either to intimidate people “or” to coerce a government or international 
organization to act.83 While the former is very broad to the extent that it can apply, for 
example, to those gangs’ activities committed with the conscious objective of intimidating, 
the latter partly signals the political aspect of terrorism. However, coercing a State in itself is 
wide enough to include acts which have no political, religious or ideological rationale,84 such 
as the assassination of a judge carried out by the mafia to compel a State to abandon 
investigations or prosecutions. It seems that the drafters were reluctant (or found it 
controversial) to rely on motive to differentiate private from public violence 85  and they 
preferred to stick with the traditional criminal principle that “no motive can excuse an 
intentional crime”.86 Article 14 of the Convention  reflects this where it provides that, for the 
purpose of extradition, a terrorist act shall not be viewed “as a political offence or as an 
offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives.”   
III. CRIMINALISATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING: JUSTIFICATIONS AND 
CHALLENGES 
Although the draft Convention was proposed with the intention of addressing terrorist 
financing independently, some doubted as to whether and if so how an ancillary act of 
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82 Michael Walzer Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with historical illustrations (3rd ed, Basic Books, 
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financing could become the crime of terrorist financing. Three approaches were proposed and 
discussed during the negotiations on the draft convention: 1) to treat terrorist financing as an 
ancillary form of participation in the offence of terrorism, 2) to criminalize only the acts of 
financing of terrorist groups, 3) and to consider terrorist financing as an independent crime. 
While the drafters adopted the third approach, other approaches are favoured when the 
Convention is applied at national levels.  These approaches will be discussed in this part. 
A.  Terrorist Financing As an Ancillary Form of Participation in the Offence of 
Terrorism 
During the first and second reading of the draft Convention, reservations were expressed as to 
whether it was necessary to separately and independently criminalize terrorist financing.87 It 
was argued that having an ancillary nature, the financing of any of the existing offences 
defined by the sectoral conventions would constitute participation or complicity in that 
offence, and the provisions on accomplices in the sectoral conventions were enough to cover 
such financing.88 While rejected by the drafters of the Convention, similar reasoning was 
given by some jurisdictions to refuse to establish an independent offence of terrorist 
financing. Aruba, for example, expressed the view that “several parts of the terrorist 
financing offences” as required by the Convention could be covered by the various existing 
provisions on accomplices in Aruba law.89 In addition, it was argued that a separate and 
independent offence might overlap with some of existing crimes under its law.90     
In some jurisdictions, terrorist financing may alternatively be considered as coming close 
to the notion of an inchoate crime in the sense that its criminality is not dependent on the 
completion of a subsequent offence. In the Netherlands, for instance, the financing of a 
terrorist act used to be prosecuted as “preparation of an offence” under Article 46 of the 
Dutch Penal Code. 91 The Dutch Supreme Court in a ruling defined ‘preparation’ as “an 
incomplete form of a criminal offence”. Widening the scope of the law on attempt, the court 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
87 UN, A/54/37, supra note 706, para. 84-86.  
88 Aust, supra note 20, at 288. 
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also ruled that “punishable preparation is further away from the completed offence than 
attempt … but involves acts in which perpetrator … intentionally fabricate[s] or ha[s] at his 
disposal means that are … intended for the commission of the criminal offence he has in 
mind”.92 In the case of terrorist financing, it seems that the financing of specific terrorist acts 
used to include the situation where the act financed or intended to be financed has not been 
attempted yet.93 However, in spite of these objections the Netherlands amended its law in 
2013 to meet the FATF’s requirements by criminalizing the financing of terrorist acts as an 
autonomous offence. 94  
B.  Criminalization of Financing of Terrorist Organizations 
There was a minority of delegations which tried to restrict the scope of the offence of 
financing only to terrorist organisations.95 They argued that a mere preparatory act cannot be 
criminalised, unless the act is of a “particularly dangerous nature”. In the context of the 
Convention, it was considered to be true only of terrorist organisations. In fact, it was argued 
“it is this aspect of organisation, which typically includes long-term planning, continuity of 
purpose, and division of labour and particular difficulty of detection, which renders entities 
and their activities so dangerous that criminalising the financing of mere preparatory acts 
justifiable”.96 They expressed that a similar rationale could not apply to the financing of 
terrorist individuals as it would simply be a participatory offence (as discussed above) which 
falls within the scope of the sectoral conventions listed to the Convention. Such a reference to 
terrorist organisations required the introduction of the precise and detailed elements of the 
definition of ‘organization’. 97  While most of the proposed definitions of ‘organization’ 
emphasized the hierarchical structure of a group of persons with common objectives,98 the 
drafters began to raise doubts over the usefulness of defining ‘organization’. 99  The 
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Convention was finalised and the drafters avoided including a definition of ‘organisation’ in 
the view that the definition of ‘organization’ may vary from one case to another.100   
Even the UN Security Council, which has engaged in the suppression of the financing of 
groups associated with Al-Qaida as another method of countering terrorist financing, has 
failed to define a ‘terrorist organization’ or provide legal guidelines for identifying terrorist 
groups. Instead, it has adopted an “operational” or listing and de-listing approach to the 
issue.101 The Security Council in Resolution 1267 (1999) established a committee102, namely 
the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and gave it a mandate to create and update a list of 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with al-Qaida.103 Having regard to 
the information provided by the Member States and regional organizations,104 the committee, 
which consists of the Security Council member States, is obliged to make a decision (by 
“consensus of its members”) on whether an individual or organization proposed is eligible to 
be designated as terrorist or delisted from the list.105 However, the inclusion of a group on the 
list provided by the UN Security Council is not always considered as “conclusive evidence” 
of the terroristic nature of that group. In this regard, an Italian court argued that the list has 
merely “an administrative value”, which does not “override the principle of the free 
assessment of evidence by an independent judge”.106   
Designating an individual or group as terrorist without instituting criminal proceedings is 
also adopted by some States. For instance, in the US, a group may be designated as a terrorist 
group by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
the Treasury.107 The main criterion used to designate a group as terrorist is that the group 
engages in terrorist activity or “retains the capability or intends to engage in terrorist activity 
or terrorism”.108 This approach, however, is subject to criticism because of the lack of a 
certain legal base and procedure for designating individuals or groups and freezing their 
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assets. 109 In fact, this approach reduces the degree of judicial control of the designation 
process, and, instead, politicizes the targeting process,110 which increases the risk of failure to 
abide by fundamental principles including the right to a fair hearing, “due process, right to 
property and freedom of association”.111  
In addition, the lack of a definition of a terrorist group or legal requirements for 
identifying terrorist organizations has resulted in disagreement among States and 
international organizations about which organizations or individuals should be listed or de-
listed. 112  In this regard, it is instructive to compare the list of States’ and international 
organizations’ blacklisted terrorist organizations since “there are notable omissions”.113   
The importance of addressing the organizational character  of the offence of terrorism, 
however, has been highlighted by the European Council through its establishment of terrorist 
group offences. The EU Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating 
Terrorism in Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision requires states member of European 
Union to criminalize “directing a terrorist group” as well as “participating in the activities of 
a terrorist group including by supplying information or material resources or by funding its 
activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the 
criminal activities of the terrorist group”.114 Similar to the definition of “organized criminal 
group” provided by the 2000 United Nation Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime,115 the Framework Decision defines a terrorist group as a “structured group of more 
than two persons which [has been] established over a period of time and [is] acting in concert 
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to commit terrorist offences”.116 A ‘structured group’ means “a group that is not randomly 
formed for immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally 
defined role for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure”. It is 
worth noting that the FATF provides a wider definition in the sense that it does not require of 
a terrorist organization some measure of structure or the time factor.117  
The Framework Decision is applied by European Union’s member States, but using 
somewhat different interpretations.118 For instance, the financing of a terrorist organization in 
the Netherlands comes close to the notion of inchoate crime119 but as discussed above it does 
not merge into the category of a preparatory offence in the sense that a direct relation 
between the act of financing and a specific terrorist act is not necessary.120 In other words, the 
Netherlands criminalizes the financing of a terrorist group as “participation” in the group 
under article 140a of the Penal code. In general, participation in a group whose aims are to 
commit offences is regarded as “the preparatory acts of entering into and maintain a long-
lasting collaboration, which is aimed at commission of the crime”.121 In the case of terrorist 
financing, article 140a does not require that the funds collected and provided be used for the 
commission of a specific act, or are intended to be used for such an offence. The requirement 
is that the funds should be collected or provided for the “benefit” of a terrorist 
organization. 122 According to the Dutch case law, an ‘organization’ is “a structured and 
lasting form of collaboration between two or more persons”. 
Spain criminalizes the financing of a terrorist group as “belonging” to the group. 123 
According to the article 571(3) of Spanish Criminal Code, terrorist organizations are those 
groups which 1) are formed by a large number of persons, 2) possess weapons or dangerous 
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instruments and 3) have the particular purpose of “subverting the constitutional order or 
seriously breaching public peace”. The financing of such a group under the article 576 (1) of 
the Spanish Criminal Code is considered as an act of “collaboration with the activities or the 
purposes of a terrorist organisation”. Collaboration, in article 576 (2), is defined as the 
provision of “information on … or use of accommodation or storage facilities; concealment 
or transport of individuals related to terrorist organisations or groups; … and, in general, any 
other equivalent form of co-operation, aid or mediation, economic or of any other kind 
whatsoever, with the activities of those terrorist organisations or groups”. Similar to the 
approach taken by Spain, some other Ibero-American countries do not establish an 
independent offence of terrorist financing. Argentina, for example, illegalizes terrorist 
financing as “illicit association” to a terrorist organization (Article 210 of the Argentine 
Criminal code). 124 Or Colombia, in Article 340 of the Colombian Criminal Code, treats 
terrorist financing as an agreement to commit crimes,125 which is similar to the concept of 
conspiracy in common law countries. 
C. Terrorist Financing As an Independent Offence  
Despite the above-mentioned approaches, the tendency in the negotiations on the draft 
convention was towards retaining an independent offence of terrorist financing.126 The idea 
that the provisions on accomplices in the sectoral conventions were sufficient to cover all 
aspects of terrorist financing was rejected. Instead, it was argued that the financing of a 
terrorist act, in and of itself, is as serious an offence as the actual terrorist act.127 This notion 
is based on the assumption reflected in the preamble of the Convention: “the number and 
seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may 
obtain”; 128 so, it was concluded that the financers of terrorism should be punished as severely 
as those who commit terrorism.129 The application of this approach can be seen in Australia 
where the penalty for the commission of terrorism financing is equal to the one which applies 
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for the commission of terrorism 130 or in France where under article 421-2-2 of French 
Criminal Code “it constitutes an act of terrorism to finance a terrorist organisation”. It seems 
that the drafters were determined to give the new offence a broad scope which covers “the 
financing of any and all crimes” defined by or annexed to the Convention.131   
This approach is also justified in academia with regard to the harmful and dangerous 
nature of the act of terrorist financing. It is argued that terrorist financing should be 
considered to constitute “a separate primary harm rather than an ancillary harm” since 
“reliable financing” can change the conventional harm of terrorism from “sporadic and local” 
and give it a “continuous and broader nature” by enabling terrorists to expand the scale and 
scope of their influence across vast areas and expose various people.132 It is exemplified how 
solid resources enable terrorist groups such as the FARC and Al-Qaeda to recruit members, 
supply themselves with adequate weapons and  lunch and expand their activities anywhere in 
the world.   
The injurious and dreadful consequences of terrorism serve also an important function in 
the construction of terrorist financing as an independent offence.133 It is argued that terrorist 
offences are “multi offensive” in that they endanger many “protected values” such as “life, 
physical integrity, property, freedom and national security”.134 As terrorist financing allows 
terrorism to become real, the act of financing terrorism poses ex ante threat to those values 
too. As such, it is believed that there is enough justification to extend the reach of criminal 
law to rationalize the criminalization of the preparatory act of terrorist financing as an 
autonomous crime.135   
The criminalization of terrorist financing should be also regarded as a part of “a larger 
shift in criminal justice from an offender-oriented towards a proceeds-oriented” approach”136 
which has been specifically developed in the fight against organized crime which produces 
large profits for criminals. The main justification for the adoption of this approach is its 
“possible deterrence value”. 137  It is believed that attacking the root of all economically 
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motivated crimes would confiscate the incentive of perpetrators to commit those crimes.138 
At an organizational level, “going after the money” is assumed to incapacitate criminal 
organizations by taking away their financial lifeblood, “eliminating their capacity to trade and 
reducing their attractiveness to recruits”.139  
The criminalization of money laundering is considered as the key component of this 
approach since criminals may hide the proceeds with third parties140 or give them a legitimate 
appearance to the extent that confiscation is not possible. 141  So, for the sake of the 
confiscation of such proceeds, criminalizing laundering can provide a legal tool for law 
enforcement authorities to deal with suspicious property and assets either in the hand of third 
parties or the real owner 142  without requiring the prosecution to prove the guilt of the 
criminals of the predicate crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 143  That is, confiscation is 
possible by proving the charge of money laundering conduct or the “ownership” of the 
proceeds. In addition, the fight against money laundering is considered as a means of 
collecting evidence against the higher-level criminals who stay aloof from criminal activities, 
but who do come into contact with the proceeds derived from the criminal activities.144 This 
contact provides a paper trail of records which constitute the involvement of the top criminals 
in the criminal activities (predicate crime) from which the proceeds derived. 
Regardless of how effective the application of this approach has been in the fight against 
organized crime, 145 the logic of this argument hardly fits into the case of terrorism and 
terrorist financing. Firstly, it should be noted that terrorism is not a crime committed for the 
purpose of making money. It is a “politically motivated act of violence” 146  with two 
distinctive financial characteristics: 1) terrorists need less money to act than those criminals 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
138  Ethan. A Nadelmann “Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: US Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy 
Jurisdictions” 1986 18(1) Inter-American Law Review 33, at 34. 
139 Levi, supra note 137, at 228. 
140 Frank Verbruggen “Proceeds-oriented criminal justice in Belgium: backbone or wishbone of a modem 
approach to organised crime?” 1997 5(3) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 314, at 
318. 
141 Koh, supra note 79, at 39. 
142 Stessens,  supra note 136, at 86. 
143 Koh, supra note 79, at 43.  
144 Stessens, supra note 136, at 86. 
145 R. T. Naylor “Follow-the-money methods in crime control policy” in Margaret E. Beare (ed) Critical 
reflections on transnational organized crime, money laundering, and corruption (University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto ; London, 2003). See also Peter Alldridge “The moral limits of the crime of money laundering” 2002 
5(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 279. 
146 Robin Morgan The demon lover : the roots of terrorism (Updated ed, Piatkus, London, 2001), at 40. 
22 
 
who seek to maximise their financial gains;147 2) terrorist funds are derived from legal and 
illegal sources. Taking these facts into account, it seems implausible to argue that going after 
terrorists’ funds undermines their incentive simply because funding terrorism is “a product of 
an ideology”.148 As long as there is a desire for politically or ideologically inspired people to 
seek their purposes through violence, they will discover a way to do so. In terms of an impact 
on the organizational capacity of terrorist groups, while drying up terrorists’ funds may have 
disruptive effects on the potential of the groups to recruit and conduct operations on the scale 
of the September 11, it does not necessarily result in deterring or resolving “terrorism 
risks”.149 Instead, it may “reshape” the risks in the sense that, as the case of al-Qaeda shows, 
a hieratical (single-centralized) group may be replaced by smaller, decentralized groups150 
which seek individually damaging set of scattered attacks.151 Therefore, the amount of money 
these groups would seek “would be much smaller; the means used to raise them would vary 
widely and depend on the local conditions, … there would be much less need for fund 
transfers and the communication among groups … would be minimal”.152 A concern is raised 
that if terrorist networks become increasingly decentralized and self-funding, it is much 
harder for authorities to track and capture their funds.153 This also challenges the assumption 
that “terrorists need a financial support network”. 154  It is worth to note that similar 
conclusions were drawn by many regarding efforts to interrupt finances of organized 
crime.155   
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Although by criminalizing money laundering techniques, the freezing and confiscation of 
the proceeds of criminal activities can be facilitated, attacking terrorist finance as a tool “to 
starve of funds “can be “problematic” and “premature”.156 The main problem in this regard 
derives from the fact that the nature of terrorist financing conduct is “the inverse of the 
structure of the money laundering offence”.157 Although money laundering cases are based 
on predicate offences already taken place, the principal offence on which terrorist financing is 
premised, in most cases, is not committed or even attempted yet. Freezing such funds appears 
to be much more difficult than the one in money laundering cases as the law enforcement 
agencies need to establish a hypothetical link between the suspicious funds and a possible 
terrorism connection. From a practical viewpoint, as the 9/11 Commission Report indicates, 
focusing on the freezing strategy may also throw away the chance of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies to monitor the movement and transfers of those funds, understand 
terrorists’ networks, and consequently search them out and disrupt their operations. 158  
D.  Terrorist Financing As a Predicate Offence of Money Laundering 
Following the adoption of the Terrorist Financing Convention, the FATF now also 
emphasizes the criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offence; but  referring 
to “the close connection between international terrorism and, inter alia,  money 
laundering”, 159  it additionally pushes countries to criminalize terrorist financing as a 
predicate crime to money laundering.160 There are, nonetheless, some uncertainties about the 
scope of this FATF recommendation. Practically, it is not clear what the reference to the link 
between terrorism and money laundering implies? Does it mean that terrorism is a crime 
which generates proceeds which need to be laundered? This has had an impact at a national 
level. India, for example, defines “proceeds of terrorism” as “all kinds of properties which 
have been derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act or have been acquired 
through funds traceable to a terrorist act …”.161 While terrorism defined by the Convention is 
the use of violence against civilians which results in bodily injuries for the purpose of 
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intimidating or coercing, it seems that India either is confusing terrorism with the acts carried 
by terrorists or their financiers to raise funds for terrorist purposes or intends to label any acts 
executed by terrorists as terroristic. The consequence of such an interpretation would be 
criminalization of persons rather than their conduct.  
In addition, terrorist financing logically does not fit into the money laundering scheme. 
Terrorist financing does not necessarily involve money laundering processes since the source 
of funds and the direction of financial flows in terrorist financing are considerably different 
from the ones in money laundering.162 Regardless of this fact, even if it is assumed that 
terrorist financing includes money laundering processes or is another form of money 
laundering (in so-called “reverse-money laundering”)163, it does not make any sense at all to 
criminalize a form of money laundering (terrorist financing)  as a predicate offence to another 
form (money laundering).  Probably to avoid this inconsistency, Saudi Arabia in article 2 (d) 
of its Anti-Money Laundering Statute mistakenly considers terrorist financing as a form of  
money laundering, rather than establishing an independent offence of terrorist financing as a 
predicate offence to money laundering .164  
IV. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF TERRORIST 
FINANCING 
The drafters of the Convention obviously struggled with introducing terrorist financing as an 
autonomous offence. This is not only because delineating the elements of the new offence of 
financing, which is, in most cases is in itself victimless, harmless and preparatory in nature, is 
difficult and controversial, but also because the drafters could not succeed in providing a 
precise and comprehensive definition of terrorism, terrorists and terrorist groups, the 
financing of which should be independently criminalized. Under the shadow of such a failure, 
the result could not be expected to be promising. Neither could it be hoped that the 
criminalization of terrorist financing, in a way it was finalized, would be easily accepted and 
similarly understood or practiced by States parties to the Convention. This part is devoted to 
showing how the negotiations on the elements of the crime of terrorist financing took place 
and how such criminalisation is understood and implemented at national levels. 
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A. The Elements of the Offence of Terrorist Financing  
The finalized draft of the Convention defines the basic terrorist financing offences in article 2 
(1) as follows: 
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any 
means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the 
intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in 
part, in order to carry out: (a) [a]n act which constitutes an offence within the scope of … 
[annexed conventions]; or (b) [a]ny other act intended to cause death and serious body injury 
to a civilian … . 
The Convention in article 2(3) gives difference meaning to this definition by adding that 
“[f]or an act to constitute an offence set for forth [article 2 (1)], it shall not be necessary that 
the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to an offence” annexed to the 
Convention or the offence of terrorism defined by the Convention.  
1. Controversy on the definition of the term “funds”  
Before examining the elements of the offence of terrorist financing provided in the above-
quoted paragraph, attention needs to be devoted to the term “funds” to which reference is 
made. Despite the first165 and revised draft166 of the Convention in which the term ‘funds’ 
which was used in a  generic definition that encompassed “any form of pecuniary benefit”,167 
the drafters decided to stretch the meaning of the term ‘funds’ beyond its dictionary meaning. 
The Convention extends the meaning of the funds to cover  
assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however 
acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, 
evidencing title to, or interest in, such  assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, 
travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of 
credit.168 
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This definition seems to include “anything under the sun”, from “animals, buildings, or 
vehicles of any kind” to any other objects which have pecuniary value. 169 Under such a 
definition, the title of the Convention would be more precise to be titled “material assistance” 
than ‘the financing of terrorism’.170 As illustrated in the discussion below, which examines a 
very broad approach and more narrow approaches to interpreting ‘funds’ and ‘funding’, the 
apparent broadness of this definition, which may seem functional in abstract proves, 
however,  to be controversial when it is applied at national levels. 
a. Definition of the term “funds”: a broad but controversial interpretation. 
The Convention does not clarify what the expression “but not limited to” refers to. From a 
US perspective, which applies a very broad definition of support, this means support beyond 
pure funding. That is, the US law prohibits providing “material support or resources” to 
terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations. 171 The term “material support or resources” 
contains not only funds and tangible goods, but also “training”, “personnel”, “transportation”, 
“service” and “expert advice or assistance”, “except medicine or religious materials”. 172  
However, the precise scope of the “material support and recourses” provisions has proved 
controversial and come under constitutional attack for their vagueness. The main challenge 
that the US courts have faced is deciding whether the support provided by groups seeking to 
advocate for human rights and peace to and with the organizations designated as terrorist 
organizations fits the definition of “material support and resources”.173 In the complicated 12-
years Humanitarian Law Project litigation, the plaintiffs, among other things, claimed that 
prohibitions against providing “material support and resources” to foreign designated terrorist 
organizations are “unconstitutionally vague”.174 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin 
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enforcement against the ban on providing “training, expert avarice or assistance (when 
derived from “specialized knowledge”), service and personnel”.   
Despite the clarifying explanations of these terms added to the material support 
provisions,175 the District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that these terms (except the 
term “personnel”176) are impermissibly vague. With regard to the term “training” which is 
defined as “instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general 
knowledge”,177  the court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that the term “training”, does not 
clearly  “put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that his or her contemplated action is 
unlawful” because  it is highly improbable “that a person of ordinary intelligence would 
know whether, and when teaching someone to petition international bodies for tsunami 
related aid … is imparting a “specific skill” or general knowledge”, and because “a plaintiff 
who wishes to instruct members of a designated group on how to petition the United Nations 
to give aid to their group could plausibly decide that such protected expression falls within 
the scope of the term “training””. 178  The court stated that even if persons of ordinary 
intelligence could understand the scope of the term training, the term would remain vague as 
it could still be read to cover speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment.179  
With regard to the term “expert advice or assistance” defined as imparting “scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge”, 180  the plaintiffs argued that the “specialized 
knowledge” portion of this definition is unclear because “it merely repeats what an expert is 
and provides no additional clarity”;181 so, “they must now guess whether their expert advice 
constitutes specialized knowledge”.182 The Court of Appeals ruled that   
“specialized knowledge” includes the same protected activities that “training” covers, such as 
teaching international law for peacemaking resolutions or how to petition the United Nations 
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to seek redress for human rights violations”. … [T]he phrase “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge” does not clarify the term “expert advice or assistance” for the average 
person with no background in law”.183    
The insertion of the undefined term “service” to the definition of the ‘material support’ 
provisions has been also attacked on vagueness grounds. Emphasizing that the plaintiffs 
could freely engage in human rights and political advocacy “on behalf of” designated groups 
before any forum of their choosing, the defendants argued that the dictionary meaning of the 
term ‘service,’ which is “an act done for the benefit or at the command of another” or useful 
labor that does not produce a tangible commodity”, clarifies the scope of the prohibition on 
the provision of service.184 The plaintiffs opposed the defendants ‘contradictory arguments, 
claiming that such a definition “forces the plaintiffs to guess whether human rights and 
political advocacy action taken “on behalf of” another, which [the] [d]efendants concede is 
protected action, or “for the benefit of another”, which [the] [d]efendants argue is 
prohibited”.185 Adopting the District Court’s reasoning and its holding, the Court of Appeal 
found the term “service” unconstitutionally vague because “the statute defines ‘service’ to 
include ‘training’ or ‘expert advice or assistance’, terms the court has already ruled are 
vague”, 186  and because “it is easy to imagine protected expression that falls within the 
bounds’ of the terms ‘service’”. 187  
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision on insufficient and 
controversial grounds. It found that the lower courts inappropriately merging the plaintiffs’ 
vagueness challenge with their First Amendment concerns.188 It claimed that the provisions 
survive scrutiny if each of those challenges is regarded independently. With regard to the 
vagueness challenge, the court criticized the lower courts’ approach for examining the 
statute’s application in any possible circumstances, not to the facts before them.189 While 
acknowledging that “the material-statute may not be clear in every application”, 190  the 
Supreme Court upheld that most of the activities in which the plaintiffs wish to engage are 
clearly banned by the provisions.191 That is, a reasonable person would realize that training 
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the PKK’s (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) 192 members to use international law to resolve 
disputes or to petition the UN for relief falls within the scope of the terms “training” and 
“expert advice or assistance” because they impart a “specific skill”, not “general 
knowledge”.193 The court found that political advocacy on behalf of the PKK or LTTE (The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)194 may be also regarded as material support in the form of 
providing “personnel” or “service” the scope of which are extended by the statute to cover 
coordinated or directed, and not “independent”, advocacy.195 The court refused to answer the 
plaintiffs’ questions of “how much directions or coordination is necessary for a conduct to 
constitute a “service” or “personnel”? Would any communication with any members be 
sufficient? Would a leader? Must the relationship have any formal elements, such as an 
employment or contractual relationship? What about a relationship through an 
intermediary?”196  The court found these questions too “hypothetical” to be considered.197  
With regard to free speech claims, the Supreme Court, in a controversial ruling and for the 
first time in its history, ruled that the government may prohibit the provision of material 
support in the form of political advocacy of the type at issue to a terrorist organization 
without violating the First Amendment.198 Favouring urgent political demands, 199 the court 
recited the government’s concerns that foreign terrorist organizations are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that training and coordinated support, which takes place in coordination 
with or at the direction of a terrorist organization, in the form of advocacy of a terrorist 
group’s lawful activities might be put to violent ends in the way that money, food and other 
“fungible” resources could be.200 They may “lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups … 
that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members and to raise funds”.201 
Providing foreign terrorist groups with material support in any form strains the US’s 
relationships with their allies and undermines their efforts to prevent terrorism.202 Terrorist 
groups acquainted with the United Nations human rights bodies might use also the 
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information to “threaten, manipulate and disturb”. 203 Assisting groups to peruse peaceful 
negotiations might be used as “a means of buying time to recover from short-term setbacks, 
lulling opponents into complacency, and ultimately preparing for renewed attacks”.204  
The politically-motivated decision of the court has been criticized mainly because neither 
the court nor the government provided any evidence to prove how the plaintiffs’ advocacy of 
human rights or peacemaking could be turned to terrorist activities. 205  Regardless of its 
reliability, the court’s reasoning is moot; that is, if the harm of political advocacy is adequate 
to justify the prohibition, why it is not sufficient to justify the ban on ‘independent’ advocacy, 
which “is not directed by, or coordinated with, a designated terrorist organization”, and which 
also might free resources, legitimatize groups or give terrorists the opportunity of exploiting 
it for their illegal purposes. 206  The court’s reasoning also raised the concern that if the 
government does not intend to discriminately suppress particular advocacy for particular 
groups, why does not it (or should not have banned) ban the provision of “job training” to 
other groups such as gangs which might make them more effective criminals or lend them 
legitimacy? Or should peaceful coordinated advocacy with activist non-governmental 
organizations like Greenpeace be proscribed on the theory that these organizations sometimes 
use illegal methods to achieve their goals?207 Might advocating for delisting a foreign terrorist 
group, which usually requires some degree of coordination with the organization, be 
considered as provision of material support in the form of “services to the group? After the 
decision in the Humanitarian Law Project’s, the answers to these questions may be yes, 
although they differ from question to which the court was applying itself.208.  
In a similar case,209 the Court of Appeals complicated the issue by holding that the First 
Amendment does not permit the government to proscribe advocacy coordinated with a 
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“domestic” terrorist organization. Although it applied the Humanitarian Law Project, the 
court reasoned that the coordinated advocacy for a designated group whose assets has already  
been frozen could not free up the group’s assets for its illegal purposes simply and logically 
because there is no any assets available.210 Nor does it endanger the US relationship with its 
allies as it is domestic. 211  However, neither the court nor the statute defined the term 
“domestic”.212 
b. Narrow definition of the term “funds”. 
Unlike the US and the other States that  broadly define the term “funds”,213 some States 
impose define funds to include only pecuniary resources or to funds of a certain value. 
Following its proposal in the negotiations on the Convention,214 Japan, in Article 2 of the Act 
on the Punishment of Financing of Offences of Public Intimidation, uses the term “shikin” 
which is the translation of the word “funds” and which is used and understood as “cash and 
monetary instruments easily convertible into cash”.215 In the case of the law at issue, the 
scope of the term “shikin” has been also defined by the Ministry of Justice of Japan under 
whose jurisdiction a law is enacted and applied to include not only “cash and other means of 
payment”, but also “other kinds of assets that are provided or collected with the intention of 
gaining such cash or other means of payment as a fruit or to be converted into such cash or 
other means of payment”.216   
The scope of the terms “assets” is also limited under German law by section 89a (2) 
number 4 of German Penal Code to comprise only assets which are not “insubstantial” in 
value. The term insubstantial is defined by the German Parliament to include movable and 
immovable property of a certain value. It was added that “assets [that] might be deemed 
insignificant when seen in isolation may be more than merely insubstantial if, in an overall 
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evaluation, they have made a greater than merely insubstantial contribution to the preparation 
of a serious violence act endangering the state”. 217 With regard to financing of terrorist 
groups, broadening the scope of term “assets”, Section 129a (5) of the German Penal Code 
forbids provision of the “support” for terrorist groups. While the term “support” is not 
defined,  according to the Federal Supreme Court, “support” of a terrorist group includes 
“any objectively useful, supportive, and therefore also all types of provision of funding 
referred to under the [Terrorist Financing] Convention”.218  However, the definition of a 
terrorist group within the meaning of the Section 129 is narrower than the definition provided 
by the FATF.219   
While the German approach has been criticised by the FATF,220 it should be noted that 
the drafters of the Convention did not take into account the similar suggestion put forward 
during the negotiations, and which emphasised the fact that the Convention “should be 
carefully reviewed so as to avoid the criminalization of minor offences”.221 
2. The objective elements of the offence: what constitutes acts of financing?  
Defining the material act of the new offence is not as easy as one may imagine. It is because 
the act of financing, in its nature, is harmless and preparatory, and, in many cases, has a legal 
appearance. Unsurprisingly, the drafters of the Convention struggled with clarifying how and 
when an act of financing turns into the crime of terrorist financing. In a revised draft of the 
Convention, the term “financing” was defined in a separate paragraph to mean “the transfer 
or reception of funds, assets or other property, whether lawful or unlawful, by any means, 
directly or indirectly, to or from another person or another organization.”222 However, such a 
definition provoked serious differences of opinion among the delegations. 
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The most controversial issue in this regard was whether the act of financing should 
include “the reception of funds in addition to their transfer”.223 A concern was expressed that 
the term “transfer” did not include all kinds of financial assistance. An alternative proposal 
was made to replace the term transfer with “providing, provisions” or “making funds 
available” “so as to make it clear that an actual transfer was not required per se”,224 and “to 
provide a broader scope of the term financing beyond the technical connotation of 
transfer”.225  
The retention of the term “reception” was also opposed on the basis that “it would cast the 
meaning of the term financing too broadly, criminalizing a wide variety of activities beyond 
what was originally intended”, from “active acts of financing” to “the passive act of 
receiving”.226 It was also pointed out that the term financing did not need to include the case 
of intermediaries who received funds as “the subsequent transfer of those funds would fall 
within the scope of the term transfer”.227 
On the other hand, the retention of term “reception” was supported as it could enable 
authorities “to counter the funnelling of funds through middlemen, who possessed the 
specific intention required by the draft convention, or through other similar complex financial 
arrangements used to finance terrorist acts”.228 It was also pointed out that the deletion of the 
reference to “reception” would restrict the prosecution of the intermediaries who possesses 
funds, but decline to transfer them or get arrested before transferring them. A concern was 
expressed that if the delegations considered a reference to “reception” necessary, a specific 
intent element in relation to the act of reception should be defined.229 A relative suggestion 
was proposed in favour of the criminalization of the act of reception “as a separate offence to 
transferring”.230 As a result of the divergent views on the definition of financing, the drafters 
decided to delete the reference to the term “financing”. In the final draft of the convention, 
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the objective element of the offence was defined to mean the unlawful provision or collection 
of funds.231  
While this definition was accepted by the delegations without any further argument, there 
are some uncertainties in regard to the application field of this definition. First of all, unlike 
the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo 
Convention) in which the possession of proceeds is regarded as one of the material elements 
of money laundering,232 the Terrorist Financing Convention is vague on whether the terms 
collection and provision can be extended to cover the possession of funds. Different 
approaches have been adopted by States. Unlike Japan,233 the UK in Section 16 of Terrorism 
Act (2006) criminalizes the “possession” of money or property intended to be used or likely 
to be used for terrorism. 
In addition, the replacement of the terms transfer and reception by the terms collection 
and provision without any explanation results in different understandings. The main question 
in this regard is how these two acts (collection and provision) should be treated? On the one 
hand, in some jurisdictions, such as Portugal, the collection of funds is regarded as a 
preparatory act which constitutes “an attempt or preliminary form of attempt”.234 Similarly, 
in Spain, the financing of a terrorist organization constitutes an attempted offence when funds 
are collected in order to be provided to the terrorist group in the furtherance of its illegal aims 
and activities.235  
On the other hand, some believe that “the collection of funds” and “the provision of 
funds” are two distinct acts, each of which represents “a separate offence”.236 It is argued that 
“although collecting funds may be a preparatory act to their provision, it is not a prerequisite 
to it since funds provided to terrorists need not have been the object of a prior collection”.237 
So, if a person raises funds and then provides them to terrorists, he perpetrates two different, 
but successive, crimes. Moreover, in the case of the involvement of intermediaries, the person 
who commits the “collection offence” is different from the person who perpetrates the 
“provision offence” by providing the funds to the terrorists. In such a case, however, the 
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question may arise as to whether the transfer of funds from collectors to intermediaries 
should be regarded as a collection or a provision? In the US where the term collection 
includes “raising and receiving”, and the term provision means “giving, donating and 
transmitting”,238 a court did not try to differentiate between these two acts. It simply held that 
“the banking activities of receiving deposits and transmitting funds between accounts on the 
basis that the accounts (and funds) belong to groups engaged in terrorist activity” or charity 
fronts may create criminal liability under the US law.239  
It is worthy of note that in some jurisdictions, the illegality of an act of collection depends 
on who the financers are. In Japan, for example, the collection of funds for terrorist purposes 
does not create criminal liability if the collectors are not terrorists.240 Their acts will not be 
punishable unless and until they provide the collected funds to terrorists.241 In other words 
the crime is never inchoate; only choate. 
3. The requirement of unlawfulness 
What gives an unconventional appearance to the Convention is the requirement of 
unlawfulness in Article 2 (1); that is, funds have to be collected or provided “unlawfully”.242 
As the German delegation in the negotiation pointed out, if the Convention aims at 
criminalizing the act of financing terrorism as an offence, “the mentioning that such financing 
has to be unlawful seems superfluous”.243 It should be noted that the same qualifier was used 
in the Terrorist Bombing Convention so as not to criminalize the lawful use of explosives.244 
The application of this qualifier in this case is justified on the basis that non-military people 
may lawfully use explosives for civilian purposes such as construction and mining; 245 
however, such a justification cannot be applied in the case of terrorist financing since the 
provision or collection of funds for use in committing terrorist acts cannot be legal in any 
event.  
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As far as the discussions in the travaux préparatoires of the Convention are concerned, 
the term “unlawfully” was included to add “an element of flexibility” to the definition by 
excluding from the ambit of the application of the Convention financing cases such as 
“ransom payments”, 246  or cases which “might have the unintended result of aiding the 
commission of” terrorist acts 247  such as the provision of material assistance to groups 
believed to pursue terrorist offences as well as humanitarian activities.248 Similar concerns 
were expressed by the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
the United Nations  High Commissioner for Refugees, whose material assistance to groups of 
individuals (refugee camps were quoted) might unintentionally fall into the hands of the 
guilty.249 It is also cited that the term “unlawfully” might be retained by the drafters to mean 
“conduct undertaken without authority (whether legislative, executive, administrative, 
judicial, contractual or consensual) or conduct that is otherwise not covered by established 
legal defences or relevant principles under domestic law”.250 
Regardless of what the drafters wished to exclude from the ambit of the application of the 
Convention, the inclusion of the qualifier “unlawfully” has left a gap in the Convention, 
which is open to different interpretations. In fact, the insurmountable difficulty that the 
drafters faced in introducing the new offence of terrorist financing was how to define 
terrorism distinguishable from the acts committed by freedom fighters in furtherance of a 
struggle against oppression and foreign occupation.251 As mentioned earlier, all attempts in 
this respect failed because the drafters could not adequately outline the contours of terrorism 
and terrorist acts; they also avoided defining terrorist groups. In such uncertain and 
controversial circumstances, it is not surprising that the term “unlawfully” can be used as a 
“shorthand reference to grounds excluding” the financing of acts and groups that a state does 
not wish to label them terrorist and unlawful.252 For example, Switzerland253 and Austria254 
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introduce an exclusion of criminality for an act of financing directed to the establishment or 
re-establishment of a democratic and constitutional regime or the exercise or protection of 
human rights.255 However, how and on what basis the legitimacy of people who resort to 
violence to establish a democratic situation or protect human rights should be determined 
may vary from one state to another, depending on whose side a state would be on (the current 
civil law is Syria is a good example).  
In the absence of clarity and consensus on whether (or how) terrorism includes a situation 
of armed conflict, the inclusion of the qualifier ‘unlawfulness’ gives rise to controversy over  
whether the terrorist financing offence includes cases where the financing is carried out for 
the support of situations involving armed conflict. It seems that countries are confronted with 
dilemmas. Some states, such as Switzerland, may not regard an act of financing as unlawful 
“if with the financing, acts are to be supported that are not in contradiction with the rules of 
international law pertaining to armed conflicts”.256 Other states,  such as New Zealand257, 
may favour broadening the meaning of terrorism to include any activities that occur in a 
situation of armed conflict, and the purpose of which is to cause death and bodily injury to a 
civilian, and to intimidate a population or to compel a government to do or prevent from 
doing an act. In such a case, counter-terrorist financing laws can be applied to the financing 
of armed groups involved in a situation of armed conflict, including freedom fighters.   
4. The link between acts of financing and terrorist acts  
One of the main challenges that the drafters faced was how to outline the scope of the new 
offence so that it could not to be understood or interpreted as a preparatory offence to 
terrorism. To do so, the drafters had to clearly define the connection between acts of 
financing and a terrorist act. Under the initial draft of the Convention, the offence was 
defined to include “the financing of a person or group of persons” who “commits or proposes 
to commit” an offence annexed to the Convention or a terrorist act defined by the 
Convention. 258 While the language of this definition, which refers to the commission of 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
255 It is worth noting that Greece, in Article 187A (8) of its Penal Code, had included a similar exception; but it 
removed the exception in order to meet the FATF requirements. See Financial Action Task Force Follow-up 
Report to the Mutual Evaluation Report of Greece (28 October 2011), para. 60.  
256 Mark. Pieth “Criminalization of the fianncing of terrorism” 2006 4(5) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, at 1081. 
257 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (New Zealand), Section 5(1)(c) and 4 (1). 
258 UN, supra note  6, Article 2.  
38 
 
subsequent terrorist acts, seemed to suggest that the act of financing need be related to a 
specific act, it was argued that there should be no need for the establishing of a precise 
connection between particular funds provided to terrorists and a specific act because most of 
the funds given to terrorists are spent on long-term preparations which are not directly related 
to a particular attack.259 It was also pointed out that, while it can be possible to trace the 
providers of a physical item used in the commission of a terrorist act, it would be very hard 
(if not impossible) to trace and prove that a specific amount of funds or money have been 
used to facilitate or finance the commission of a particular terrorist attack.   
On the other hand, those delegations which tried to limit the scope of the offence to the 
financing of an organization, found this reasoning inapplicable to the case of the financing of 
individuals.260  They argued that while the independent criminalization of the financing of 
groups, which have the elements of “long-term planning, continuity of purpose, division of 
labour and particular difficulty of detection”, is justifiable, the financing of an individual in 
order to enable that individual to commit a crime would merely constitute a preparatory 
offence under national and international law. As mentioned earlier, this reservation was not 
taken into account as the draft sponsors wished the offence to have a broader scope.      
After failure to define terrorist groups, the drafters deleted the references to both a person 
and organization.  The Convention was reformulated with a direct reference to terrorist acts, 
which do not necessarily need to be committed or attempted; that is, the Convention requires 
the criminalization of the collection or provision of funds with the intention that the funds 
should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, to commit “an 
act” annexed to the Convention or “any other act” which matches the definition of terrorism 
provided in Article 2 (1). To make sure that the scope of Article 2 could expand to include 
the financing of any and all terrorist-related offences, the draft sponsors, France, suggested 
that “in order to convict a person for an offence [defined by the Convention] it shall not be 
necessary to prove that the funds were in fact used to prepare for or to commit a specific 
offence”.261 Therefore, it does not matter how remote the act of collection or provision of 
funds is from the actual commission of subsequent terrorist offences. What is important for 
an act to be considered as a terrorist financing offence is the mental elements, that the 
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collected or provided funds “should be” or “are to be used” for terrorist purposes. This will 
be discussed in detail in the next part.   
As a result of the inclusion of this paragraph, the proposal, which tried to restrict the 
scope of the offence to the financing of the terrorist acts which constitutes “main” offences 
within the scope of the conventions listed to the Annex did not find its way into the final 
draft. 262 The “main offence” was defined as any offence within the scope of one of the 
Conventions set forth in the Annex, excluding attempts and contributory or participatory 
offences. The proposer (Austria) may have been concerned that a financial contribution to an 
act which constitutes complicity in an offence such as hostage-taking or a car bomb attack 
would be far from the subsequent terrorist act. In the proposer’s view, such criminalization 
would create “the danger of very long chains of participation removing a reasonably close 
nexus to the main offence; the scope of application would become too large”.  
However, in practice, controversy still exists as to how the preparatory act of financing a 
specific terrorist offence or financing of an individual who is to commit a particular attack 
can be classified as an independent offence.  In practice, some countries resist criminalizing 
the financing of a specific act as an independent offence (probably because of its 
inconsistency with their domestic law). For instance, “if the financing of terrorism is related 
to a specific crime, Denmark’s approach to criminalization ... is through a person’s 
complicity in the terrorism offence” pursuant to sections 114 (terrorism offences) and Section 
23 (complicity) of the Danish Criminal Code.263 Similarly, in Germany, the financing of 
terrorist acts and financing of individual terrorists may be prosecuted based on the 
participatory offence of “assisting another to commit a crime.264   
Perhaps the main concern lies in the fact that the application of the Convention to the 
financing of a specific act results in over-criminalization. For example, if someone provides 
his car to terrorists with the intention that it should be used or with the knowledge that the car 
is to be used in a car bomb attack at a specific place and at a certain time,265 the car provider, 
according to the Terrorist Financing Convention, is to be charged with the primary offence of 
terrorist financing. The car provider can be also convicted of another ancillary offence under 
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the Article 2 (3) of the Terrorist Bombing Convention. While the Convention is silent on this 
issue and while national attempts vary with regard to the issue of multiple convictions,266 the 
FATF insists that criminalizing terrorist financing as complicity in a terrorist’s act is not 
sufficient to meet its requirements. In spite of the FATF’s recommendations, and in order to 
avoid multiple convictions, suspects, in Finland267 and Sweden268, are not prosecuted for the 
terrorist financing offence if the act is punishable as the commission of or an attempt to 
terrorist offences covered by their Penal Code, or offences for which a severe sentence is 
provided elsewhere in the law.     
5. Key role of the subjective element in the construction of the new offence 
The final formulation of the offence in which no causality between the act of financing and 
subsequent terrorist acts needs to be established turned the attention of negotiators to the 
definition of the mental elements; that is, what the collector or provider of funds needs to 
intend or know in order to commit the crime of terrorist financing. Under the working 
document submitted by France, a person commits a crime if that person intentionally 
proceeds with the financing of a person or a group in the knowledge that such financing “will 
or could be used, in full or in part, in order to prepare or commit” terrorist acts.269  
However, the inclusion of the expression “could be used” was heavily criticized mainly 
for its vagueness. It was argued that the acts of financing should be criminalized only if the 
funds “provided” are likely to be used for the commission of terrorist acts.270 “The language 
“or could be used” covers all possibilities of a use of the assets or property for terrorist 
activities and leaves too much room for interpretation.  
The majority of states suggested the deletion of the term “could be used”, which would 
have resulted in the requirement that the financer should know or intend that the funds 
provided “will be used, in full or in part, to commit or to prepare” the commission of a 
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terrorist act. A suggestion was also made to lower the mens rea standard to risk-taking, 
requiring the criminalization of the provision of funds where “there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the funds will be used for” the preparation or commission of terrorist offences.271  
Another proposal of particular interest was put forward by a group of some delegations 
(Austria, Belgium, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland) which tried to limit the scope of the 
criminalization to the financing that were not remote from the act of terrorism. According to 
their proposal,  
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person 
unlawfully and intentionally provides funds, directly or indirectly and however acquired, to 
any person or organization committing or attempting to commit: 
a) Any offence within the scope of the one of the Convention listed in the Annex ... or  
b) ...   
Such financing shall [either] be made with the intention that the funds be used [or in the 
knowledge that the funds are to be used], in whole or in part, for the commission of the 
offences mentioned above.272   
No rationale was provided for this proposal. But, the proposal sponsors explained that “the 
inclusion of the term ‘or attempting to commit’ [in this definition] is subject to the deletion of 
any reference to attempts and participatory offences under the scope of the Convention listed 
in the annex”.273 In fact, the proposers tried to introduce a filter in the definition in order to 
exclude from the ambit of the Convention the financing of an attempt of the offences listed in 
the Annex because they had doubts that a contribution to an act which constitutes complicity 
in those conventions and which would be too far remote from its subsequent act could be 
independently criminalized in any jurisdictions. The language “committing or attempting to 
commit” also implied that the financer had to be aware of the material causality between his 
or her provision of the funds and an attempted or committed act.   
None of these proposals were taken into account as they seemed to emphasize on the 
knowledge and intention of the financer in relation to the preparation or commission of a 
terrorist act. This would have restricted the scope of the new offence to an act of complicity, 
which was not what the draft sponsors wished. In other words, from the drafter’s perspective, 
any reference to the attempt or commission of a subsequent terrorist act or inclusion of any 
qualifier which excludes from the scope of the Convention the financing of particular terrorist 
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acts,274 including the financing of attempts and participatory offences as proposed, might 
have endangered the effectiveness of the Convention. This is because it could have required 
the prosecution to infer the knowledge or intention of a financer in regard to the specific act 
for which the funds have been collected or provided.  
As a result, the drafter decided to reformulate the definition in Article 2(1) to be read as 
follows: 
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any 
means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the 
intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used , in full or in 
part, in order to carry out:  
 a) An act which constitutes an offence ... defined in one of the treaties listed in the 
Annex; or 
b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act. 
Paragraph 3 was added to Article 2 to emphasize that “for an act to constitute an offence set 
forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an 
offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b)”. As a result, the inclusion of 
paragraph 4 and 5 in Article 2 was accepted without any argument. These provisions 
criminalize any attempt to finance, including secondary participants, those organizing and 
directing others to commit terrorist financing, and conspiracies to commit terrorist financing. 
The inclusion of these provisions extends the scope of the criminalization to conduct which is 
remote even from the act of financing, regardless of whether the funds are used for a 
subsequent terrorist act and regardless of whether a subsequent act is committed or planned.  
In short, what makes the act of financing an offence is not the criminal or terrorist nature 
of the act, but the malicious intent of the financer. With the inclusion of the paragraph 3, the 
fault element of the crime acquires a “hypothetical” nature as the financer who does not know 
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about an actual terrorist act should assume or admit that that the recipient will use the funds 
collected or provided to further a terrorist cause. Under such a formulation, in a similar way 
to the law in the UK and Canada,275 it would be more precise to speak of the financing of 
“terrorist purposes” or “terrorist activities”.276  
This conception of the offence in which the intention or the knowledge of the financer is 
referred to (but not relied on) future conduct or a possible harm is “groundbreaking” in the 
law on terrorist offences.277 While all of the prior terrorist-related conventions target the 
harmful and self-standing offences such as murder, kidnapping or destruction of and severe 
damage to property and require  a fault element which is specified in relation to the physical 
elements of these offences, the Terrorist Financing Convention criminalizes victimless, 
nonviolent and  preparatory acts or illegal (but non-terrorist) conduct (where funds are 
derived from illegal sources) only on the basis of the terrorist purposes that a financer may 
have.  
The criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent stand-alone offence extends 
the scope of criminal law in a way not previously done in the criminal law. Traditionally, the 
law has incriminated preparatory acts through the extension of criminal liability to accessorial 
liability. Accessorial liability has a “derivative” nature in the sense that the prosecution 
should prove that the substantive offence has been committed or least attempted.278 Under a 
new approach pursued by some common law jurisdictions, the scope of inchoate crimes has 
been extended to include “encouraging and assisting” offence(s) that “will be committed”.279 
It is clear that this offence applies irrespective of whether the substantive or anticipated 
offence(s) are or actually will be carried out by the principal offender. The inchoate offender 
in these offences must believe, without any significant doubt, that the principal offender will 
commit the anticipated offence(s) with the relevant intent element.280 The inchoate offender 
must also believe that any circumstances or consequences specified in the anticipated 
offence(s) will be fulfilled. Therefore the prosecution must specify the offences that the 
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inchoate offender’s act might have assisted or encouraged. 281  In contrast, the terrorist 
financing offence need not be proved in relation to any specific or subsequent terrorist crime. 
The only relevant offence here, as some argue, is a “fictional crime” that the financer 
assumes or admits the recipient of the funds will commit.282  
6. Can this formulation be justified on the basis of analogy with remote harms? 
Generally speaking, the autonomous criminalization of preparatory acts including terrorist 
financing should be considered in the context of the shift towards “preventive” approach,283 
where “the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is increasingly overshadowed by the 
pre-crime logic of security” 284 . Under this approach, States are licensed to criminalize 
“abstract endangerment” acts that pose the risk of certain harms. 285  These acts are 
criminalized not because they are “wrongful or harmful” in themselves, but because they 
create an opportunity for the commission of future danger.286 The typical examples of these 
acts are possession offences: possession of weapons,287 of illegal drugs288, and burglarious 
instruments289. Unlike inchoate offences, conviction for these offences does not necessitate 
proof of intent to commit any subsequent crime. Instead, the prosecution simply needs to 
prove that the offender has been aware of the possession “under suspicious 
circumstances”. 290 The justifiability of criminalizing these types of offences is, however, 
questioned. It is argued that these offences “may criminalize people at a point too remote 
from the ultimate harm, not allowing for a change of mind”.291 It is also pointed out that 
possession offences extend the scope of criminal law beyond the inchoate crimes, sweeping 
too wide in the sense that “[t]hey encompass cases where there is no potential social 
harm”.292  
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Regardless of whether the criminalisation of remote harms are justifiable, it seems that 
there are substantial differences between these offences and the terrorist financing offence 
introduced by the Convention in terms of risks that flow from them, objects involved, and 
circumstances within which these offences are carried out. While the risk in many of the 
remote harm offences is more visible and immediate, a risk which is either explicit 
(dangerous driving), or implicit (speeding), 293 the risk of harms in the terrorist financing 
offence is even more remote. Indeed, it is far too remote and “fictional” as the financer need 
only assume or admit that the funds collected or provided will be used (by the financer or 
others) for terrorist purposes. Terrorist financing is more similar to the rare cases when a 
State, for example, prohibits certain public demonstrations because of what they may prompt 
others to do in response.      
In regard to objects and circumstances, while the criminality of remote harm offences is, 
in most cases, reliant either on the illegal nature of the object possessed (possession of 
controlled drugs or unregistered possession of a firearms or explosives), or on the 
circumstances within which the object is being used (possession of tools for use in a burglary 
at the place other than the abode of the possessor),294 terrorist financing includes material 
assistance or financial contributions which, in most cases, have a legal appearance (fund-
raising or the transfer of the funds collected to middlemen). Even if the financing involves 
illegal transactions such as purchase of explosives, although the criminal intention of the 
offender can be easily related to the illegal circumstance that the offender is involved in, the 
proof of the intention or knowledge of the offender in relation to terrorism or a terrorist act 
seems difficult (if not impossible) and, furthermore, according to the Convention, 
unnecessary. 
Moreover, unlike remote harm offences in which the fault element is the intent in relation 
to the act that the offender carries out, not to its eventual harmful consequences, the fault 
element in terrorist financing cannot be merely an intent to perform acts of financing because 
such acts, in themselves, do not have a terrorist nature especially when all that is involved is 
the collection or the transfer of the funds collected to middlemen.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
293 Ashworth, supra note 280, at 38. 
294 Theft Act 1968 (UK), s. 25(1) 
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V. EXAMINATION OF THE FAULT ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF 
TERRORIST FINANCING 
The question which the drafters left unanswered is, if there is no need to link the acts of 
financing to any subsequent terrorist act, and if financing alone can hardly provide a solid 
basis for prosecution or conviction, what should the financer know to be held criminally 
responsible? How should the intention be read where the act of the financer is far remote 
from any subsequent act? And what are the particular context or circumstances of the offence 
of terrorist financing?        
While the Convention is not clear on these matters, the answer to these questions seems to 
be very critical as all other elements of the offence are heavily reliant on the fault element:  
1. While financing is the basic element of an offence in the inchoate mode (collection or 
provision of funds with intent to supply terrorism), the drafters established an 
independent offence of terrorist financing by putting so much weight upon the fault 
element: financing with the intention or in the knowledge that the funds collected or 
provided will be used for commission of a terrorist act. The Convention does not even 
differentiate between the act of provision and the act of collection which seems (at least 
in some cases) to be a prerequisite to the act of provision; that is, as long as an act, either 
collection or provision, is involved in the idea of terrorism, it falls into the category of the 
offence.  
2. The term “funds” has been defined very broadly to cover any contributions (with or 
without legal origin) which are intended or known to be used for terrorist purposes.   
3. The Convention requires the criminalization of financing of an attempt and attempt to 
finance which are carried out with terrorist intent although they are very remote from a 
possible subsequent act and although their criminalization extends the scope of criminal 
liability beyond the law of attempts. 
Drawing on States’ legislation on terrorist financing and cases, this part examines whether 
the fault element of an independent offence of terrorist financing can be adequately defined 
whether such criminalization can be justified using traditional justifications for 
criminalization.  
To clarify the issue, it would be better to test the fault element in the circumstances within 
which financing may take place. In reality and regarding the current counter-terrorism 
regime, two scenarios can be envisaged:  
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1. When the financing is carried out for the preparation or commission of a terrorist act.  
2. Financing of a group or a person who is designated as terrorist or is involved or has been 
involved in terrorist activities.        
A. Financing of a Terrorist Act  
This scenario includes the situation where a financer is involved in the collection or provision 
of funds known or intended to be used for the preparation or commission of a terrorist act. 
The main question here is whether, in the absence of a requirement to link the financer’s 
conduct with a terrorist act, the imposition of guilt on the financer is justifiable and 
compatible with the basic principles that underlie the criminal law? According to the 
Convention, the financer acquires independent criminal liability (similar to terrorism) for the 
conduct that is no more than preparatory to the intended commission of the subsequent 
offence. While many features of this situation are similar to an inchoate offence or 
complicity, the common argument put forward in justification of this approach is that the 
criminalization of such an act as an inchoate crime may not secure the conviction sought 
since, “in most jurisdictions, aiding and abetting occurs only when the alleged perpetrator has 
knowledge that the principal offence is being committed or at least attempted”.295   
Three objections to criminalizing the financing of a terrorist act as an independent 
offence, however, stand out. One is that normal principles seem not to support such liability: 
if financing carried out to support the commission of a particular offence is independently 
criminalized without the requirement to prove the financer knew of or intended to fund a 
specific violent act the occurrence of which depends on a further decision by the financer or 
by another, such an intervening voluntary act might relieve the original actor of the 
subsequent offence of criminal responsibility, and so it is the financer who should be 
punished. If the financer is to perform the subsequent offence, such an approach does not 
treat the financer as an independent agent capable of deciding to abandon his criminal 
enterprise.  
This also brings the potential for injustice. The fault element of the financer should not be 
inferred with regard to the putative offence for which the financing has been carried out 
because the commission of the subsequent crime may not be necessarily the result of the 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
295 International Monetary Fund “Suppressing the financing of terrorism: a handbook for legislative drafting” 
(2003) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2003/sfth/> viewed at 12 Oct 2014. See also Koh, supra note 79, 
at 66.   
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financing. But under the Convention, any contribution seems to suffice for liability, no matter 
how small and no matter whether the contribution has any impact on the commission of the 
subsequent offence.296 So, financers in both minor and major cases of financing incur the 
same liability and are subject to the same punishment. Such an approach is not acceptable to 
some jurisdictions. For example, in spite of the FATF’s criticism, 297  in Germany, 
“insubstantial” contribution to the commission of a violent act is outside the scope of the 
offence of terrorist financing even if it is collected or provided with the intent to be used for a 
terrorist act.           
Finally, the criminalization of the financing of a terrorist act leads to confusion about the 
further fault element that should be proved. If financing can be criminalized without any need 
to prove its connection to the subsequent offence for which the financing has been carried 
out, what state of mind should be shown in order to hold the financier criminally responsible? 
If the Convention should be read to mean that the collection or provision of funds should be 
merely carried out for terrorist purposes, what, then, amounts to terrorist purposes or terrorist 
intent? Is terrorist intent definable? Does terrorist intent mean the objectives of terrorist acts 
defined by the Convention: intimidating population or compelling a government or an 
intentional organization to do or to abstain from doing an act? That is, should a financer 
know or intend that the funds collected or provided to be used to bring about these purposes? 
1. Is ‘terrorist intent’ adequate as the mental element? 
Regarding the fact that there is no consensus on the definition and elements of terrorism, it 
seems that such a reading of the Convention may give rise to the absence of a harmonized 
implementation of the Convention. In this regard, national attempts to come to grips with the 
fault element have proved that defining ‘terrorist intent’ can be controversial. For example, 
Germany, in implementing the Convention, criminalizes the collection or provision of funds 
carried out with the intent to fund serious violent act “endangering the state”. “Endangering 
the state” is defined as “an offence against life ... or against personal freedom ... which under 
the circumstances, is intended to impair or and capable of impairing the existence or security 
of a state or of an international organisation, or to abolish, rob of legal effect or undermine 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
296 The Convention does not differentiate between minor or major cases of terrorist financing. 
297 Financial Action Task Force Mutual evaluation report; anti-money laundering and combating the fianncinag 
of terrorism; Germany (19 Feb 2010), para. 210. 
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constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of Germany”.298 As can be seen, the serious 
violent act “endangering the state” is narrower in scope than the definition of terrorist acts  
introduced by the Convention as  it does not cover the objective of  ‘intimidation of 
population’.   
Other jurisdictions have introduced explicit criteria which exclude from their 
implementation of the obligation in the Convention the financing of violent acts carried out 
for some particular purposes.  Switzerland, for instance, does not consider the financing of a 
violent act as a terrorist financing offence if the financing has been carried out with the 
intention to establish or re-establish a democratic regime or a State governed by the rule of 
law, or with the intention to exercise or safeguard human rights.299 While it is not very clear 
how human rights or democratic values can be restored by resorting to violence, imposing 
such requirements is not beyond expectation when the scope of the offence of terrorism has 
not been (cannot be) defined.  
Regardless of what constitutes terrorist intent and how such intent could be inferred, 
courts in some jurisdictions do not require the proof of terrorist intent as an essential element 
of preparatory terrorism offences, including the terrorist financing offence, at all. For 
example, an Australian court held that it is not necessary to prove that the defendant, who 
was accused of possessing things connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person 
in, or assistance in a violent act, had terrorist intent.300 That is, the prosecution did not need to 
prove that the defendant carried out the conduct that he was accused of with the intent to 
further a political, religious or ideological cause; and with the intent to coerce, influence by 
intimidation, a State, Territory of Commonwealth government or intimidate the public or a 
section of a public.301 The Court reasoned that a defendant might not have any interest in 
accomplishing any of these purposes, but he might, for instance, be simply plying his trade, 
or doing a favour for an acquaintance, or repaying a debt.302          
But what then of the intent requirement as the connection between the act of financing 
and the subsequent violent act? Here, again, problems may arise with interpretation.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
298 German Criminal Law, sec.89a (1) 
299 Swiss Criminal Law. Art. 260 quinquies (3) 
300 Lodhi v. The Queen (2007), 179 A Crim R 470, para. 91.  
301 Australian Criminal Code, sec.100.1 
302 R v. Lodhi (2006), NSWSC 468 reprinted in Mcsherry supra note 278.  
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2. So, what is the mental element for terrorist financing? 
Generally, the mental element of a crime can be determined in relation to the physical 
elements of that crime. Physical elements, in general, can be divided into three parts: the 
individual conduct, the consequences of that conduct, and the circumstances in which the 
conduct has occurred. 303  The Rome Statute illustrates how the fault element can be 
demonstrated in respect of each material element of a crime. Setting out the requirements of 
knowledge and intention for the purposes of creating criminal liability, the article 30 of the 
Rome Statute provides that “a person has intent where (a) in relation to conduct, that person 
means to engage in the conduct, and (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to 
cause that consequence”. Similarly, knowledge only exists where the person is aware that “a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”.  
Similar to the Rome Statute, the mental element of the offence set out by the Convention 
consists of two main variants: intention that funds will be used to carry out a terrorist act, and 
knowledge that the funds are to be so used. However, it is often impossible to presume the 
intent from the physical act of financing as the conduct element of the offence consists of acts 
which are innocent in themselves (especially when the funds have a legal origin, and the 
charge is that of collecting), or which may have a criminal but non-terrorist nature.  
In addition, intention in the sense of the desire to bring about a certain consequence or 
knowledge of consequences seems to have a “hypothetical quality”304 when it comes to the 
crime of financing of a terrorist act. According to the paragraph 3 of article 2, it is not 
necessary that funds are to be used to carry out a terrorist act. If this provision has any 
meaning at all, this must indicate that intention or knowledge does not have to  linked to the 
terrorist act for which the funds are collected or provided; that is, the end use of funds is 
irrelevant, it is what the financer thinks the end use is, which is relevant. The point is that if a 
specific (subsequent) violent offence was required to be intended or known, it would limit the 
crime of financing to the equivalent of an act of complicity or attempted offences. 305 
Intending to create an independent crime of financing, the drafters of the Convention seems 
to be successful in defining what does not constitute the intent of the offence. It seems this is 
the case for all preparatory terrorism act - “the financing, planning, preparation or preparation 
of terrorist acts” - which should be treated “as serious criminal offences” even in the absence 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
303 Lehto, supra note 99, at 285. 
304 Id., at 283 
305 Id.  
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of a subsequent violent act or where there is no connection between these offences and a 
specific violent act.306 But, at national levels, this seems to lead to confusion and controversy 
over the intent that must be proved.   
3. Can awareness of a circumstance be the mental element? 
R v. Lodhi 
Awareness of a circumstance was regarded as a sufficient ground for imposing liability by the 
court in an Australian307 case where the court tried to determine the necessary fault element 
for independent preparatory terrorism offences. Lodhi was accused of three offences: 
collecting (purchasing) of two maps of the Australian electricity supply system in preparation 
of a terrorist act, possessing information regarding the ingredients for and the method of 
manufacture of explosives in preparation for a terrorist act, and seeking a price list of 
chemicals for the use of explosives for a terrorist act.308  
The accused explained that his collection of the maps had nothing to do with any terrorist 
act or part of any plan to execute a terrorist act against the Electricity Supply System.309 He 
explained he simply wanted them for a company of an electrical nature he was planning to 
establish. He gave similar explanation for the seeking a price list of chemicals. He stated that 
he was proposing to set up a business venture to export certain chemicals from Australia.310 
Regarding the possession of the materials containing information about making explosives, 
he gave evidence that many years earlier, he had seen them on a computer when he was 
studying some architectural subjects at the University of Sydney.311 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
306 The United Nation Security Council in the Resolution 1373 (2001) sec. 2 (e)  includes a provision declaring 
that all states should “[e]nsure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or 
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any 
other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and 
regulations and that  the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts. 
307 Australia in sections 101, 102 and 103 of its Criminal Code has introduced a broad range of ancillary 
terrorism offences (“possessing things connected with terrorist acts”, “collecting or making documents likely to 
facilitate terrorist acts”, “collecting or making documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts”, “other acts done in 
preparation for, or planning, terrorist acts” and terrorist financing). As the definition of funds under section 
101.1 is an expansive definition which includes various objects, and as the language of other terrorism-related   
sections - particularly the phrases such as “things” or “document” -  is very broad, these offences can capture 
many forms of financing of terrorism. But, what all these provisions have in common is that they fail to draw a 
clear connection between the person who collects materials and the subsequent offences for which the materials 
are collected.     
308 R v. Lodhi 2006, 199 FLR 364, (Whealy J).  
309 Id., para. 15. 
310 Id., para. 30.   
311 Id., para. 41. 
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Relying on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution alleged that Lodhi intended to 
“advance the cause of violent jihad and intimidate the government and the public” by plotting 
to bomb part of Sydney’s electrical Supply system.312 The prosecution referred to DVDs and 
CDs of jihadist doctrine which were found in his house. The prosecution argued that the 
possession of this material by the defendant shed lights on his malicious intention with regard 
to these offences.313 The prosecution also alleged that Lodhi was in contact with a French 
terror suspect while he was in Sydney. 
Lodhi explained that he had not seen this jihadi material, so he could not explain its 
presence at his home.314 He admitted the existence of other material containing exhortations 
to violent jihad; but, he explained that “he had either not seen it or, if he had seen it, it was 
only in part and that he had generally little to do with the contents”. 315  Regarding the 
association with the French suspect, Lodhi admitted that he was in contact with the French 
suspect, but he stated that he did so as a courtesy and favour to a foreigner visiting a new 
country at the behest of a mutual friend.316 
The Lodhi court provided a test case for the provisions on preparatory terrorism offences 
which do not define a clear fault element in relation to the physical element of these offences. 
The court needed to examine the criminal intent of the accused in the absence of the 
subsequent offence for which the preparatory acts were carried. But, the court struggled to 
come to a decision.    
The court stressed that  
an evaluation of the criminal culpability involved in any particular offence requires an 
analysis not only of the act itself, which may be relatively innocuous, but as well an 
examination of the nature of the terrorist act contemplated, particularly in the light of the 
intentions or state of mind of the person found to have committed the offence.317  
However, it read the offence as not requiring the prosecution to prove that the accused 
intended to facilitate either a specific or general terrorist act. The judge said that such 
offences “will have been committed by a person in a preliminary way ... even where no final 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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decision has been made over the final target.”318 Which means knowledge of a target is not 
needed.  
The main question is how the court could have inferred the terrorist nature of such 
preparatory acts without requiring the prosecution to prove that the accused intended to bring 
about the subsequent offence. The court’s rulings do not seem to be consistent. On the one 
hand, the court was satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt, at the forefront of the offender’s 
mind when he collected the maps, that he had not at that stage necessarily made a final 
determination as to the precise target, or the precise area of the target, that was to be hit.”319 
The court held that  
the maps themselves would not have given sufficient information to the offender. Nor would 
they, of themselves, have given sufficient insight into how such an attack upon the electrical 
system could be maintained at a time when the actor has not decided precisely what he or she 
intends to do, an offence.320  
So, the court concluded that it was “not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt ... that the offender 
had at any time made up his mind that it would be he who would carry out the bombing of the 
Australian Electrical Supply System”.321 In the same way, it concluded that although there 
was a formula for making a bomb in the accused’s possession, there was no evidence to 
suggest that the offender ever intended that there would be an enterprise involving the use of 
the formula aimed at any person, or for that matter, any property.322 
On the other hand, the court ruled that it was not important that the existing evidence 
could not demonstrate that Lodhi had ascertained and decided “when, how, where or by 
whom a terrorist act might be carried out”.323  The court found that the accused was aware of 
the circumstances in which the preparatory acts occurred. That is, the accused knew that there 
was, “in the circumstances of all three offences, really one continuing uninterrupted course of 
conduct centring upon an enterprise to blow up a building or infrastructure”.324 In spite of the 
fact that the document which contained information on how to make explosives was written 
(collected) a long time before the accused bought the maps and asked for the price list of 
chemicals, the court concluded that the contents of the document considerably fleshed out the 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
318 Reprinted in McSherry, supra note 278, at 149.  
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accused’s intention in relation to the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the maps 
and the enquiries he made of the chemical supply company.325   
In addition, the court, without explanation, considered the accused’s contact with the 
French suspect as a relevant matter to the existence of these intentions without clarifying 
what the French suspect’s role was to be with regard to any terrorist act.326 Similarly, the 
court found the accused’s possession of the “Jihadi CD” relevant, stating that the “truth is that 
all this material makes it clear that the offender is a person who has, in recent years, been 
essentially informed by the concept of violent jihad and the glorification of Muslim heroes 
who have fought and died for jihad, either in a local or broader context.”327 It stated that “the 
[Jihadi] material is eloquent as to the ideas and emotions that must have been foremost in the 
offender's mind”. The court sentenced Lodhi to 10 years imprisonment for the possession and 
collection of the materials related to terrorism and 20 years for doing an act in preparation for 
a commission of a terrorist act. The sentences were required to be served concurrently. This 
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.328  
Is the court‘s decision is justifiable and fair? If the fault requirement, as the court ruled, 
should be limited only to the awareness of the act of preparation or facilitation without a need 
to prove that an accused intended to facilitate or finance either a specific or general terrorist 
act, any preparatory act which is presumed to be connected to some sort of unplanned and 
unforeseen terrorist acts, should be punished. This is a “significant extension of concepts of 
criminal liability”329 as it imposes liability and heavy punishment on a person with unclear 
criminal intent, who proceeds with the collection or possession of materials such as collecting 
a map, asking for price of chemicals or possessing a document about how to make explosives 
which might never be used for any terrorist act. There was no proof that a terrorist act was 
even planned. While the traditional criminal law has long identified offences based on 
complicity in a crime or attempt to commit a crime, the application of this fault requirement 
colours otherwise innocent conduct as a serious offence at a very early stage.  
This mental element also cannot even be justified from a purely subjectivist approach, 
which imposes liability on the basis of a person’s intention or knowledge with which the 
person acted regardless of whether the commission of the offence is incomplete or physically 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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impossible.330 A subjectivist approach to the preparatory offences such as financing of a 
terrorist act would require a high standard of the mental element, which would be actual 
knowledge of the subsequent terrorist offence. But when there is no need to prove knowledge 
of any terrorist act, “any remaining knowledge of a terrorist activity would have to be 
extremely tenuous, abstract and hypothetical”.331 So, there is a great risk that an awareness of 
a terrorist act could be nothing more than possessing a Jihadi CD or “reckless or angry talk” 
or expression of “extreme political or religious views about past or future acts of terrorism or 
about known terrorists”.332 Such a fault requirement, of course, would not be supportable by 
a subjectivist approach.       
In addition, this loose reference to the mental element appears to unfairly reverse the 
burden of proof; that is, by not being required to link the act of collection or provision to any 
material terrorist act, the prosecution seems to have to prove little; and then the accused bears 
an evidential burden of exculpation, by introducing evidence that his conduct was nothing to 
do with commission or preparation of a terrorist act. Although the prosecution needs to refute 
the accused’s claim beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused must first put them to the task of 
doing so by establishing an evidential case that his actions were innocent first.333  
The shifting of the evidential burden is also of concern because of the breadth with which 
the fault element is identified by the Lodhi’s court. There is no doubt that by not being 
required to prove the intention of the accused as to the subsequent crime, the prosecution can 
precipitately lay charges on those who are strategically preparing for the commission of an 
offence; but it does not “provide others with sufficient certainty about what could expose 
them to prosecution”.334 So, an innocent person who, for example, provides funds in response 
to the request of an unknown impoverished student who later turns out to be a suicide 
bomber335 can put themselves at risk of being charged and convicted for financing terrorism 
if the person cannot prove that she did not intend or know the funds would be used for the 
commission a terrorist act.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Despite these criticisms, the presumption of innocence seems to be becoming so 
insignificant (at least in a democratic country such as Australia), to policy- makers, 
legislators and courts that they do not even consider it as necessary to give a reason for 
imposing a burden on the accused. The neglect of the presumption is well reflected in the 
reasoning of the Australian Minister for Justice and Customs when he justified terrorism 
offences as follows:  
In the security environment that we are dealing with, you may well have a situation where a 
number of people are doing things but you do not yet have the information which would lead 
you to identify a particular act ... When you are dealing with security, you have to keep an eye 
on prevention of the act itself as well as bringing those who are guilty of the act to justice ... 
[T]he original intention of the legislation [is] to remove any doubt that a person can be 
prosecuted for a terrorist act and acts preparatory to a terrorist act, and that our agencies can 
investigate such acts even if a specific target has not been identified.336  
4. Is general knowledge of a terrorist act sufficient? Knowledge v. Intention 
 R v. Khawaja       
In introducing a mental element for terrorism offences which are preparatory in their nature 
and which do not need to be connected a specific terrorist act, a Canadian court held that a 
general knowledge of a terrorist act is sufficient. The Ontario Court of Appeal found 
Khawaja guilty of developing, working on and possessing an explosive substance with the 
intent to perform a terrorist act, namely in what became known as the British “fertilizer bomb 
plot”. Unlike the trial court which dismissed these charges because the prosecution could not 
prove that the accused knew he was assisting in the fertilizer bomb plot,337 to secure the 
conviction, the Court of Appeal referred to section  83.19 (2) of the Canadian Criminal Code 
which states that “a terrorist activity is facilitated whether or not the facilitator knows that a 
particular terrorist activity is facilitated; or any particular terrorist activity was foreseen or 
planned  at the time it was facilitated”.338  
The accused argued that the qualifiers in this provision are not consistent with the 
approach of the traditional criminal law as it does not require adequate levels of subjective 
fault, which would be knowledge or intention related to a specific terrorist act (the British 
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fertilizer bomb plot). 339  A concern was also raised as to how a person can knowingly 
facilitate a terrorist act when he does not know that “any particular terrorist activity was 
foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated”?340 There seems “to be little or no mens rea 
at the time the actus reus of facilitation was committed”.341 
The court, however, accepted the prosecution’s argument that these qualifiers seems 
designed to address cases where a terrorist cell may not know the specific nature of the 
terrorist act he is going to carry out until the last moment.342 But, unlike the Australian 
court’s ruling, the court added an extra requirement by concluding that “it is unnecessary that 
an accused be shown to have knowledge of the specific nature of terrorist activity he intends 
to aid, support, enhance or facilitate, as long as he knows it is terrorist activity in a general 
way”.343  
The fault requirement of general knowledge of a terrorist act is different from the 
Australian court’s fault requirement in which the prosecution is not required to prove that the 
accused knew or intended to support either a specific or general terrorist act, meaning that the 
accused does not need to know that any terrorist act is planned or foreseen at the time it was 
facilitated or financed. According to the Canadian court’s ruling, the accused may not know 
the specific details of the subsequent terrorist act but does need to know “an act of terrorism 
is coming”.344 This reading of the fault requirement is similar to the reading upheld by some 
other jurisdictions. For example in Sweden, “there is a need to show that funds were provided 
with intent that a particular serious crime sooner or later will be carried out”.345  
While it seems that the Canadian court’s extra fault  requirement satisfies minimum 
standards of  knowledge since it requires some type of material or actual connection between 
the act of preparation and facilitation and the subsequent crime, there are three sources of 
uncertainty as to the breadth of such a fault requirement. First, although this fault requirement 
is broad enough to secure the conviction of those who facilitate the commission of a terrorist 
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act without knowing the specific details of that terrorist act until the last moment, it imputes 
guilt to those who are remotely and indirectly linked to a terrorist act and who do not have 
any intention to finance or facilitate any terrorist act or do not know how their conduct will 
serve terrorism. For example, a restaurant owner who knows that certain customers are using 
his restaurant to plan a terrorist act can be held criminally liable for financing a terrorist act 
the same as those who are directly involved in the facilitation of that terrorist act.346 The 
court may not accept the accused’s argument that he did not have any particular intention to 
finance the terrorist act, and that his main purpose was to gain money from his business. The 
court may argue that whatever his purpose was, he knowingly made his restaurant available 
to be used for planning a terrorist act.347  
In addition, it appears that this mental requirement suggests a mens rea element closer to 
recklessness or negligence than a knowledge requirement. That is, if an accused does need to 
have the knowledge of the specific nature of an upcoming terrorist act, he cannot be 
absolutely or virtually certain that his funds or donation will be used for the commission of 
the terrorist act. It seems that the Judge in Khawaja case admitted such an interpretation by 
concluding that “I see nothing wrong in asking, indeed expecting law-abiding citizens to 
avoid any knowing activity that aids, support or advances terrorist activity or a group 
engaged in such activity.”348 However, his conclusion was criticized as it “runs the risk of 
blurring the distinction between punishing a person as a terrorist for their subjective fault or 
for their negligence in not taking reasonable steps to avoid assisting terrorists.”349 It was 
pointed out that any understanding that negligent engagement in the facilitation or financing 
of a terrorist act would suffice for the offence is inconsistent with the Canadian law [as well 
as the Terrorist Financing Convention], which excludes references to negligence and 
recklessness. 350 Concern is also raised that it would be unjust to expose “negligent and 
intentional assisters of terrorism to the same liability and punishment”.351  
The breadth of the mental element is also worrying as it may impose liability on innocent 
conduct not carried out for the commission of any terrorist act unless otherwise proven. For 
instance, if a member of a terrorist group which is planning a terrorist act engages in fund-
___________________________________________________________________________ 
346 Kevin E. davis “Cutting off the flow of funds to terrorists: whose funds? which funds?who decides? ” in 
Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem, and Kent Roach (eds) The security of freedom : essays on Canada's anti-
terrorism bill (University of Toronto Press, Toronto ; London, 2001), at 305.  
347 Id. 
348 Rutherford J, see  R. v. Khawaja, supra note 338, para. 36.  
349 Roach, supra note 331, at 286. 
350 Id.  
351 Id., at 286. 
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raising for religious purposes, he can be charged for terrorist financing if he knows of this 
possibility, even if it is only remote, as all elements of the offence exist. The act of fund-
raising along with the knowledge of an upcoming terrorist act provides a sufficient ground for 
the prosecution to ask for the conviction of the accused for terrorist financing without a need 
to prove that he intended to finance the terrorist act. The accused can be held liable for the 
financing of a terrorist act if he fails to prove-in the sense of providing some evidence to 
disturb the inference of his knowledge-that the act of fund-raising was carried out for 
different purposes and he did not think it was to be used for terrorism. The imposition of such 
liability on a person only on the basis of mere knowledge about an upcoming act is 
unjustifiable. This brings back the argument full circle to the necessity of proving the actual 
knowledge of the terrorist destination of funds, or the intention that the funds will be used for 
the commission of the subsequent offence. However, proving such intent limits the scope of 
terrorist financing to an inchoate offence or complicity in the crime of terrorism itself. This 
was the interpretation that the supporters of the Convention wanted to and always avoid.        
B. The Fault Element of the Offence of Financing Terrorist Organizations   
Despite the fact that the Convention failed to define a terrorist or terrorist organization, 
cutting off financial resources of terrorist organizations is another and later much-used 
method of addressing terrorism financing. However, applying the Convention to suppress the 
financing of terrorist organizations gives rise to uncertainty as to what amounts to the fault 
elements of the offence of the financing of terrorist organizations.  
This mainly resulted from the ambiguity of the provisions of the Convention. The term 
‘funds’ has as illustrated above a broad meaning which includes any materials, legal or illegal 
tools, fungible and non-fungible resources, which may not even be usable for the commission 
of a terrorist act, and which in themselves may not indicate a disposition to support terrorism. 
Also, according to Article 2(3) of the Convention, the terrorist end use of funds is irrelevant, 
which literally means there is no need to prove the link between financing and a terrorist act. 
Therefore, in the case of financing of a terrorist organization, it is not clear what the elements 
of intention, that funds should be used to carry out a terrorist act, or the knowledge that funds 
are to be so used, refer to. What can be inferred from the wording of the Convention is that 
the Convention should not be read to mean that mental states of financers has to refer to any 
terrorist offences being prepared or carried out by a group, otherwise the offence of financing 
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of terrorist groups would come close to the concept of complicity in the sense that it depends 
on the commission or preparation of its subsequent terrorist offence. For a similar reason, the 
proof of the knowledge of the intention of the recipient of funds to commit specific offences 
is not intended to be the fault element.  
Such a vague reference to a connection between a financer’s and illegal activities of a 
group has been the cause of some confusion. Is it enough if a financer knows the identity of 
the recipient of funds as a designated terrorist group or a group which involved in terrorist 
activities? What if the financer knows the recipient is a terrorist group, but intends to further 
the lawful purposes of the group? Does the offence need specific intent? Or is does it only 
require recklessness? These questions will be examined in this part. In order to avoid over 
complication of this discussion, it is  assumed that the law of a State is clear on the definition 
and scope of a terrorist organization. The discussion also does not have regard to whether and 
how the political process of designating a group as terrorist may impact the criminalization of 
terrorist financing.  
1. Does the knowledge of the identity of the recipient of funds suffice?  
The most direct way to hamper a corrupt and dangerous group is to proscribe it outright, 
including by making the knowing provision of any support to the group an offence. But, there 
are multiple legal challenges targeting such a fault requirement. First of all, if the knowledge 
of the identity of the recipient alone suffices for the intent, somewhat similar to status or 
situational offences, the offence of financing terrorist groups seems to impose punishment on 
an act based only on the connection of that act with others’ state of being, not to their 
criminal conduct. In other words, the physical element of collecting or providing funds is 
innocuous enough; it is (the knowledge of) the status of the person or the group with whom 
people associates criminalizes these acts. Consequently, the intent of financers is irrelevant. 
While the principle of legality seeks to punish criminal conduct or participation in a 
criminal act “not criminal types”,352 and while the principle of mens rea emphasizes that 
people “should be held liable only for events or consequences which they intended or 
knowingly risked”, 353  one may argue that applying a status-based approach to terrorist 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
352 McSherry, supra note 278, at 157. 
353 Ashworth, supra note 280, at 75. 
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group- related offences is “neither novel, nor extraordinary”.354 The criminal law has long 
included “status offences”, such as consorting with criminals, that penalize people “on the 
basis of whom they know and associate with”.355 However, these offences have usually been 
considered to be of a less serious nature (summary offences), and a result of the controversial 
expansion of police powers in response to the threat of criminal groups and gangs.356 In 
contrast, terrorist organization and association offences are classified as serious offences 
which carry hefty sentences357, and which inflict grave damage to the accused’ reputation.  
Historically, it was also unprecedented in democratic states to apply such an approach to 
the mens rea of criminal organization and association offences. For example in the US, courts 
in dealing with cases of membership in and association with quasi-political groups seeking 
the violent overthrow of the government as well as social welfare goals, such as the 
Communist Party, ruled that: 
[i]n our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when imposition of punishment on a status or on 
conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other 
concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be 
sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt.358   
However, where the relationship between the accused’s involvement and the criminal 
activities of a group is “too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal liability”, 359or 
where the involvement includes a status or conduct that establishes a relationship with a 
criminal enterprise rather than its criminal activities, the principle of personal guilt “are be 
cured, so far as any particular defendant is concerned, by the requirement of proof that he 
knew the organization engages in criminal activity, and that was his purpose to further that 
criminal activity”.360 This approach was later applied to civil cases where, for example, the 
Supreme Court ruled that: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
354 Simon Bronitt “Australia's legal response to terrorism: neither novel nor extraordinary?” (The  Year in 
Review Conference, Castan Center for Human Rights Law, Melbourn, Australia, 4 Dec 2003). 
355 Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering “Pre-crime and counter-terrorism; imagining future crime in the 'war 
on terror'” 2009 49(5) British Journal of Criminalogy 268, at 633. 
356 Alex Steel “Consorting in New South Wales: substantive offence or police power?” 2003 26(3) University of 
New South Wales Law Review 567, at 576. It should be noted that in the so-called “war on terror”, there are 
some serious status offences with heavy sentences. For example in Australia, the offence of “being “knowingly 
concerned” in the importation of illicit drugs” carries the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. However, 
these offences are not common. See Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry Principles of criminal law ([1st ed, 
LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2001), at 162.  
357 McCulloch and Pickering,  supra note 355, at 633. 
358 Scales v. United States (1961), 367 U.S 203, 205,  para 224-5   
359 Id., para. 226  
360  Id., para. 226.  
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Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some 
members of which committed act of violence. For a liability to be imposed by reason of 
association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals 
and that the individual held a specific intent to further illegal aims.361  
Even with regard to providing fungible resources, the US Supreme Court, in another case, 
ruled that the mere provision of money (membership dues) to the Party did not establish a 
“meaningful association with the party” on the basis of which the accused could be liable. 362  
The court adopted the position of the prior courts by requiring the prosecution to prove that 
the accused was aware of the nature of the Party and its involvement in illegal activities, and 
he intended to contribute to those criminal activities by paying dues and attending some 
meetings.363      
Similar to the above-mentioned practice, 364  the Palermo Convention, in establishing 
criminal group and association offences, introduces a specific mental element far greater than 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
361 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982), 458 U.S. 886, para. 920  
362 Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy (1963), 374 U.S 469, para. 476-77.  
363 Id., para. 477-80.  
364 In the US, there was a controversy on whether such a fault requirement can be applied to terrorist financing. 
While courts in the early cases of terrorist financing applied the fault requirement by holding that a donor is not 
liable for supporting a designated terrorist group so long as he does not know or specifically intend that the 
recipient of funds would use the support to further the terrorists functions of that group (See for example United 
States v. Al-Arian (2004), 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294), courts, in subsequent cases, took the position that the 
Communist Party court’s decisions are not applicable to terrorist financing. It is argued that the Communist 
Party cases “address[ed] situations where people are punished by reason of association alone ... in other words, 
merely for membership in a group or for espousing its view”. Instead, the terrorist financing offence 
criminalizes “the act of giving material support, and there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by 
giving terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions. Nor, of course, is 
there a right to provide resources with which terrorists can buy weapons and explosives” (See Humanitarian 
Law Project v. Reno (2000), 205 F. 3d, para 1133). It is also argued that terrorist groups are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such groups aids their unlawful purposes by freeing up resources that 
can be used for terrorism. So, because all contributions can be directly or indirectly used for terrorism, it does 
not matter what a financer intends that his contribution will be used. As long as he knows the group that he is 
supporting is a terrorist group, he is criminally liable (Id., para. 1136).     
 As Jonakait argues, this “action-membership distinction” reasoning is not persuasive for following reasons. 
Although membership seems to be a status, a membership is not acquired “passively”. “Except for memberships 
resulting from birth, it takes some sort of act to become a member of a group”( See Randolph N  Jonakait “The 
mens rea for the crime of providing material resources to a foreign terrorist organization” 2004 56 Baylor Law 
Review 861, at 905) . Also other courts applied the same mens rea requirement to the cases where “the 
defendant had engaged in variety of activities [beyond mere membership] to support the Communist Party 
including organizing new members, teaching Communist principles to students and members, and soliciting 
contribution for the Communist party (see Humanitarian Law Project v. United States (2003), 352 F.3d 382 , 
para. 395).       
In addition, membership is kind of providing human resources to an organization. If any contribution to a 
terrorist group frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts, an active member may very well free up 
another member to undertake illegal actions in furtherance of the group’s illegal purposes (Id., para. 910).  
Moreover, the courts in Communist Party cases applied this fault requirement (the specific fault requirement) to 
include not only membership, but also ‘association’. Association, from these courts’ perspective, has a broader 
meaning than membership (See for example  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co, supra note 361, para. 886). It 
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the knowledge of the identity of a criminal group. According to article 5 (1)(a) of the 
Convention, the offence of “active” participation in the criminal activities of a criminal 
organized group requires knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of the 
group or its intention to commit the crimes addressed by the Convention. With regard to the 
involvement in non-criminal and supportive activities of a criminal group - activities which 
“may not constitute crimes, but they perform a supportive function for the group’s criminal 
activities and goals” 365 - the Convention introduces an additional requirement: “knowledge 
that such involvement will contribute to the achievement of a criminal aim of the group”.366 
Such an approach can be seen in the implementation of the Convention at the national level. 
For example in Canada, a person who “knowingly... participates in or contributes to any 
activity of [a] criminal organized organization” is criminally liable if such involvement or 
contribution is made with “the purpose of enhancing the ability of [the] criminal organization 
to facilitate or commit an indictable offence”.367 
Practically, this knowledge requirement - convicting a person for the provision of funds to 
a group on the ground that he or she knows the group is designated group or it is involved in 
criminal activities - causes some concerns in terms of sweeping up both guilty and non-guilty 
mental states. A US court tested several hypothetical situations against this knowledge 
requirement:  
Under [the construction of this knowledge requirement], a cab driver could be guilty for 
giving a ride to a [terrorist organization] member to the UN, if he knows that the person is a 
member of a [terrorist organization] or the member or his organization at sometime conducted 
an unlawful activity in a foreign country. Similarly, a hotel clerk in New York could be 
committing a crime by providing lodging to that same [terrorist organization] member under 
similar circumstances as the cab driver.368  
The court concluded that this knowledge element does not satisfy the requirement of personal 
guilt as the knowledge of the identity of the recipient or the knowledge of the unlawful 
                                                                                                                                                        
captures the concept of financing; that is, “[o]ne can associate with a group in more ways than joining its formal 
membership rolls”; people may “associate with a group by donation their money, services or goods” (Jonakait, 
at 901). Also, in terms of the right of association, it is argued that “the distinction between association and 
material support is illusory. Groups cannot exist without the material support of their members and associates. If 
the right of association meant only that one had the right to join organization but not to support them, the right 
would be empty.” (See David Cole “The new McCarthyism: repeating hisotry in the war on terrorism  ” 2003 38 
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, at 15) . 
365 See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes “Legislative guides for the implementation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the protocol thereto” 2004,  at 24.  
366 The Palermo convention, Article 5(a)(ii)(b) 
367 The Canadian Criminal Code, Article 467.11  
368 United States v. Al-Arian (2004), 308 F.Supp.2d 1322, para. 1337-38 
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activities of a group is not strong enough to impute guilt on the donor’s conduct; that is, 
“when criminality and punishment are justified by a relationship to others’ conduct, that 
relationship must be sufficiently substantial to constitutionally support criminal liability”.369  
To support this conclusion, the court discussed another hypothetical situation:   
A and B are members of a [foreign terrorist group or a] FTO. The FTO exists to oppose and 
remove (by violent and non-violent means) a foreign government. A opposes the FTO's use of 
violent means to accomplish its goals. B has no problem with the group’s use of violence and 
wants to raise funds for weapons to further that interest. B travels to where A lives to raise 
money. A does not know that B is coming to fundraise on behalf of the FTO. A picks B up at 
the airport. A allows B to stay in his home, use his telephone, and use his house to entertain 
other FTO members while A is at work. B fundraises while A is gone. Under the 
government's construction of Section 2339B(a)(1),[370] A is criminally liable for providing 
transportation, lodging, communications equipment, and facilities, and, if the money raised 
results in the death of any person, he will face life in prison. A's criminal liability is 
inextricably connected to his association with B and the FTO. Further, the level of A's 
criminal punishment is totally dependent on B's and other members of the FTO's criminal 
conduct.371 
Concern also arises that such a knowledge requirement imposes liability on well-
intentioned financers. That is, because a financer does not need to intend that his or her funds 
be used for terrorist activities or for the terrorist functions of a group, no humanitarian 
support can be sent to any designated group.372 This has a chilling effect on those who seek to 
provide material resources to “the non-violent humanitarian and political activities” of 
designated groups.373 It also has a tragic effect on the provision of humanitarian aid to the 
disaster and war zone controlled by designated terrorist groups.374 In addition, this seems to 
be in contrast to the intent of the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention who desired 
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to criminalize only financing cases carried out “unlawfully”. As mentioned earlier, the 
qualifier “unlawfully” was included to the definition of offence to add “an element of 
flexibility by, for example, excluding from the ambit of application of the draft convention 
legitimate activities, such as those of humanitarian organizations and ransom payments.” 375   
2. Is the knowledge requirement the only solution? 
Despite all of the above-mentioned critiques, this knowledge requirement is justified in terms 
of dangerous and extraordinary nature of terrorist groups. An often-used line of reasoning 
argues that terrorist organizations are 
so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates 
that conduct. ... It follows that all material support given to such organizations aids their 
unlawful goals. ... [T]errorist organizations do not maintain open books. Therefore, when 
someone makes a donation to them, there is no way to tell how the donation is used. ... [E]ven 
contributions earmarked for peaceful purposes can be used to give aid to the families of those 
killed while carrying out terrorist acts, thus making the decision to engage in terrorism more 
attractive. More fundamentally, money is fungible; giving support intended to aid an 
organization's peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts.376 
Therefore, since any contribution to a terrorist group can be directly or indirectly utilized by a 
group for the promotion of the group’s illegal purposes, the financer’s intention does not 
matter; that is, “[o]nce the support is given, the donor has no control over how it is used”.377 
While this reasoning may have some merit, it can be criticized for seeking the conviction 
of a donor on the basis of how a terrorist group could use donation, not on the basis of the 
mental state of the donor.378 This approach is in contrast to the approach used to address 
groups such as the Communist Party in the US or the approach adopted to criminalizing 
organized criminal groups offences in which the focus is “on the activities and mental states 
of the associating individual not on how an organization ... might further its illegalities from 
an act of association”.379 
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In addition, the premise that terrorist groups could use any donation for terrorist purposes 
does not really justify why there is no need to introduce a specific intent greater than the 
knowledge of the identity of the group; on the contrary, in order to satisfy the principle of 
personal guilt, such reasoning necessitates a higher intent requirement. In fact, if the focus of 
the criminalization of terrorist group offences is on donation and how a group might use the 
donation, the evidence should be sufficiently strong in demonstrating that the donation is 
substantial enough in its value or its effects to strengthen the group’s illegal activities. 
Consequently, to impute guilt on the donor, it should be proved that the donor knew (had a 
specific intent) that his substantial donation would contribute to the achievement of criminal 
aims of the group.  
However, the imposition of a specific intent requirement is opposed for (among other 
reasons discussed later) creating a dangerous loophole for terrorist organizations and their 
supporters to raise and receive funds and avoid prosecution. While the specific intent can be 
inferred from the nature of support when the financing is involved in or related to the 
provision of weapons or explosives to a terrorist group,380 this may often not be the case 
when the support contains “dual use” and fungible resources. To illustrate the “security 
flaws” of this requirement, the following hypothetical situation is normally discussed: 
if a person writes a check to [a terrorist group involved in both violence and humanitarian 
activities] for $10,000 and writes on the memo line of the check for educational purposes 
only, the donor would not be liable under the specific intent standard so long as there was not 
other evidence showing an intention to aid terrorism. But, whether the donor intended to aid 
terrorism or not, the check could be used for many other projects, including illicit ones.381 
Moreover, no criminal liability could be imposed on a donor who is told (deceived) by the 
fundraiser working on behalf of the group that the money would be spent “for the support of 
orphans”, not on any violent act. Under the specific intent requirement, the intentional, 
deceived and reckless donors should be acquitted where the prosecution cannot prove the 
specific intention of the donors. So, the donation can flow into the hands of terrorists.382  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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3. Reckless financing of a terrorist group  
In order to close this loophole and to avoid legal challenges resulted from the imposition of 
only the knowledge requirement; some suggest a lower mental element of recklessness as an 
alternative mens rea to the specific intent.383 Under the recklessness requirement,384 a person 
should be held to be reckless about the terrorist end use of funds where the person knows the 
group that he is financing is a designated terrorist group, or engages in terrorist activities, but 
he proceeds with financing the group despite knowing the risk that the supplied resources will 
be used to further the illegal aims of the group; in fact, a person incurs liability when he 
recklessly supports a group by not “ensuring sufficient oversight over the supplied funds to 
make certain they are not utilized illegally”.385 
It is argued that the structure of the terrorist financing offence defined by the Convention 
gives support to such a mental requirement. 386 The Convention does not require that the 
mental elements of the knowledge, that funds collected or provided are to be used for the 
commission of a terrorist act, or the intention, that the funds will be used for terrorism, be 
proven in relation to any actual terrorist act. Also, the funds do not need to be “actually” used 
for the commission of any terrorist act; so, they do not necessarily have to have a substantial 
effect on the commission of a terrorist act. In the case of financing terrorist groups, such a 
structure is claimed to inject a concept of foreseeability into the mental elements of the 
offence; that is, when a financer intends a terrorist end use of his funds, it is not the financer 
but the recipient of the funds “whose actions may bring about the intended result at a later, 
unspecified point of time”.387 The financer also does not have control over the decision of the 
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recipient; nor can there be “absolute certainty” that the funds will be used for such 
purposes 388  especially if the funds are in a fungible form, and the recipient (group) is 
involved in multiple activities of a humanitarian as well as violent nature. Similarly, with 
regard to the knowledge element, the financer is far “too removed from” terrorist acts that the 
recipient may carry out “in terms of time and knowledge”.389 Also, the practical effect of the 
supplied funds on those acts is neither foreseeable, nor easy to determine. Therefore, when it 
is stated that the financer knows that the funds are to be used for terrorism, it means he either 
actively takes the risk that the funds will be used by the recipient for terrorism, or foresees, 
but ignores, “the possibility, sometimes even the probability that the funds may be used for 
the commission of terrorist acts”.390 In the both cases, the financer takes the risk that the 
funds will be used by others for terrorism. While in the former, the risk is willingly taken, the 
risk, in the latter, seems to be ignored, meaning that the risk is deliberately taken in the hope 
that it does not cause harm.  
In practice, it is believed that this mental requirement would secure the conviction against 
those who know or foresee whom and what their supplied funds goes to support, but they 
disguise their intention or foolish faith through, for example, a statement in the memo of  a 
cheque.391 Unlike the knowledge requirement in which the donor can be convicted for merely 
knowing that the group is a terrorist group (regardless of his intention), this mental 
requirement imputes personal guilt on the donor who cannot bring sufficient evidence that 
“there was proper oversight over the donation to ensure it was used lawfully”. 392  The 
recklessness requirement would also permit “non-reckless” resources to aid the humanitarian 
goals of a group; resources such as sending medicines and non-controversial materials to the 
areas suffered from natural disasters and controlled by terrorist groups.393  
However, there are some doubts as to whether a recklessness requirement would be a 
convincing and viable alternative as a mental element for the offence. From the Convention’s 
point of view, it should be noted that although the structure of the offence defined by the 
Convention implies that the offence may include cases of less certain mens rea, any 
interpretation whereby the mens rea of the offence is defined in terms of recklessness or 
negligence is inconsistent with the actual wording of the Convention, which clearly requires 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
388 Lavalle, supra note 169, at 499. 
389 Lehto, supra note 99, at 292. 
390 Id., at 293. 
391 Chesney, supra note 382, at 70-1. 
392 Pendle, supra note 38572, at 805. 
393 Id. 
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only two mental elements of intention and knowledge. In addition, such an interpretation 
contradicts the aims of the Convention’s drafters. During the negotiation on the Convention, 
all of the proposals which aimed at imposing liability on those who collect or provide funds 
in circumstances “where there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be used for terrorist 
purposes” were rejected.394 In addition, the drafters of the Convention added the qualifier 
“wilfully” to the definition of the offence seemingly “to emphasize that the financing had to 
be done deliberately, not accidently or negligently”.395  
In practice, although using a recklessness requirement would secure the conviction of 
those who “convincingly plead ignorance while secretly desiring” the terrorist end use of 
their funds,396  the examination of some of the hypothetical cases used above illustrates that 
this recklessness requirement would not be able to alleviate the due process concerns of 
sweeping breadth and vagueness. In terms of overbreadth, the offence under this recklessness 
requirement would still sweep-up non-guilty mental states in the scope of criminality. The 
first example is the hypothetical case where A, a member of a terrorist group who opposes 
the group’s use of violence, allows B, another member of  the group who supports the use of 
violence by the group, to use his house, phone and car, in order to do B a favour. Without 
informing A, B uses A’s property to raise funds for the group. Under the recklessness 
requirement, A would be still be liable for letting a terrorist friend use his properties “without 
monitoring him”, or, in other words, for failing “to ensure sufficient oversight when he 
provided the above mentioned resources and consequently reckless”. 397  Similarly, in the 
example of the cab driver who knowingly gives a ride to a member of terrorist group, it is 
still likely that the cab driver would incur liability if, for example, the customer (the terrorist) 
held a weapon in his bag and the driver did not have sufficient oversight over what (and why) 
the customer was carrying in his bag. Similarly, a hotel clerk could be prosecuted for being 
reckless in offering the same person services “under similar circumstances as the cab driver”. 
It is pointed out that under the recklessness requirement, providing any fungible resources 
such as money to a terrorist group would raise liability;398 therefore, no explanation would be 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
394 UN, A/AC.252/1999/WP.20, printed in UN, A/54/37. Similar proposal was put forward to criminalize “the 
financing of a person or organization in the knowledge that such financing is or is likely to be used, in full or in 
part, in order to prepare or commit” a terrorist act. See A/AC.252/1999/WP.16, reprinted in UN, A/54/37.  
395 Aust, supra note  20, at 295. 
396 Pendle, supra note 372, at 804. 
397 Id., at 806.   
398 Chesney, supra note 382, at 84. 
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accepted for writing a cheque to a terrorist group for educational purposes as the donor 
knows the group would be free to use the money as it would see fit, but he takes the risk.  
The imposition of guilt on the innocent financers in the above cases is neither surprising, 
nor unexpected; it is because their liability would not be inferred from their ‘advertent 
recklessness’ as to a proscribed consequence or their ‘reckless knowledge’ of a specific 
circumstance, but from their mere association with a member of a group whose dangerous or 
corrupt nature causes the concern that they may use any support for terrorist purposes. The 
main reason that this mental requirement acquires a sweeping character is its failure to define 
the relationship between a financer’s conduct and the criminal activities of a group. 
Normally, when a criminal liability of one person is tied to the criminal activity of another, 
culpability or guilt is imputed to the former on the basis of his awareness or intention (or 
recklessness) as to the criminal conduct of the latter, and on the basis of his awareness as to 
his ability to assist the latter to commit the crime. But, it seems that this formulation is not 
applicable to the offence of terrorist financing. That is, to establish an independent offence, 
the Convention does not require any of these elements: the act of financing should not result 
in or be related to any subsequent offence; nor do the supplied funds need to be actually spent 
for the commission of a terrorist act. Instead, this recklessness standard adds the new element 
of ‘terrorist purposes’ to the definition of the offence to fill this gap; that is, the financer 
needs to intend or be reckless that the supplied funds will be used for terrorist purposes.  
But what, then, constitutes “terrorist purposes”? No definition has been provided for these 
phrases.399 Literally, the term ‘terrorist purpose’ seems to include conduct including but of 
greater scope that just an act of terrorism. A comment has been made that “[t]his terrorist 
purpose supposedly consists of the perpetration or preparation of terrorist acts, or the 
participation in terrorist acts or terrorist training”.400 It can also include activities related to 
“the maintenance of terrorist structures” of a group;401 or if understood in an even broader 
sense, it can refer to political or religious ideology of a group. Therefore, if the funds given to 
a terrorist or a terrorist group “could be used for broad terrorist purposes including but not 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
399 The Convention in its preamble and Article 2(5)(3) uses the term terrorist purpose. But no detention has been 
provided for the term.  
400 Kai. Ambos “Our terrorists, your terrorists? The United Nations Security Council urges states to combat 
“foreign terrorist fighters”, but does not define “terrorism”” (2 October 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/our-
terrorists-your-terrorists-the-united-nations-security-council-urges-states-to-combat-foreign-terrorist-fighters-
but-does-not-define-terrorism/> viewed at 25 May 2015. 
401 Lehto, supra note 99, at 297. 
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limited to the preparation of terrorist offences”, 402  prosecution would precipitately and 
largely lay charges on any donor on the ground of taking the risk that the funds would be 
used somewhere and somehow for broad terrorist purposes. 
It seems that under this view of ‘terrorist purposes’, terrorist groups are “so tainted by 
their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct” 
or “frees up resources that can be used for” that conduct,403 and it follows that almost every 
donation can be assumed to directly or indirectly result in terrorism unless the financer proves 
otherwise. Therefore, a grocery store manager, for example, could be prosecuted for trading 
with a member of a terrorist group while he foresaw the risk that the goods sold to the 
member would meet the basic needs of the group and eventually assist the group to fulfil its 
terrorist purposes. The accused might only escape conviction if he proves that he had no 
reason to believe they would be used for terrorist purposes.     
But, when the scope of terrorist purposes is not precisely defined, what exactly should a 
donor prove to avoid falling into the scope of the offence? This requirement seems to place a 
heavy burden on a financer without clarifying what he needs to foresee, and avoid, in order to 
escape conviction. Consequently, if the financer could not adduce persuasive evidence in 
response to the prosecution’s allegations or convince the court that there was “proper 
oversight over the funds to ensure it was used lawfully”, 404  his conviction would be 
guaranteed regardless of his good -intentions or his oversight over the legal end use of the 
donation. 
 4. A specific intent Standard: intention or motive? 
Imposition of criminal liability under a higher mens rea standard (specific intent) is also 
controversial and problematic, irrespective of how narrowly or broadly the term ‘terrorist 
purposes’ is understood. Financing ‘terrorist purposes’ can be read to mean an act or acts 
which are enhancing the ability of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist act or 
acts (as the Canadian criminal law indicates). 405 Under this reading, in order to acquire 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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criminal liability, a financer needs to know or specifically intend that the funds given to a 
group will enhance the ability of the group to commit a terrorist act or acts it is involved in.  
Regardless of any controversy that may arise over what constitutes acts enabling a group 
to carry out its terrorist activities, such a fault element creates a serious evidentiary burden for 
law enforcement. That is, the prosecution would need to demonstrate what type of terrorist 
act or acts a group is involved in, how the funds supplied to the group would or could be used 
for the commission or preparation of those acts, and whether the financer knew or 
specifically intended such an end use of the funds. In practice, the proof of such a connection 
is believed to be a particularly difficult, if not impossible, especially when support is in a 
fungible form, and a group is involved in multiple activities of a humanitarian as well as 
violent nature.406 The critics of this formulation claim that this prosecutorial hurdle “permits 
skilful terrorist sympathizers to evade detection and slip through the prosecutorial net”.407 In 
addition, it seems that the Convention does not support such an intent requirement by not 
requiring the proof of the terrorist end use of funds.    
‘Terrorist purposes’, in a broader sense, can also be read to include a group’s ultimate 
aims and purposes of (what the Convention regards as) intimidating a public or coercing a 
government or an organization to do or abstain from doing. Under this definition, the mental 
element of the offence would be understood in the sense of having intent to enhance the 
ability of a group to peruse and fulfil its ultimate purposes of intimidation or coercion. In the 
absence of commission or preparation of any terrorist act from which such intent may be 
inferred, it would be sufficient for the prosecution to introduce evidence that a financer 
entertains similar views and purposes to those that the group supported holds. Such a 
reference to the ultimate purposes of a group implies a state of mind closer to a motive 
requirement than specific intent.   
Regardless of whether motive can constitutes an essential element of terrorism offences, 
the main concern is whether reliance on evidence of political motive, as circumstantial 
evidence, in the proof of terrorist financing charges would be justifiable and fair? Even 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
406 See for example US v. Arnaout, (2005), 431 F.3d. In this case, the accused was charged in several cases 
including purchasing and providing clothes, boots, uniforms, blankets, tents, X-ray machine, ambulances and  
walkie-talkies to an organization that he knew they are involved in violence and military operations. Despite the 
substantial intelligence and documentation on the close relationship between the accused and Bin laden dating 
from mid 1980s, the court dropped his terrorism charges as the prosecution could not prove that the recipient of 
the resources was engaged in “a federal crime of terrorism”, and that the accused intended the donated material 
to be used to “promote a federal crime of terrorism” (para. 1001). 
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though one may assume it is fair,408 it should be noted that there is a considerable difference 
between a person who intends the resources he supplies to be used for the commission or 
preparation of terrorist acts and a donor who, for example, admires the Palestinians’ 
resistance and their resort to violence to stop the Israeli government from the expansion of its 
settlement plan, and who supplies resources to the area controlled by Hamas for humanitarian 
or educational purposes. But under this motive requirement, a court would need to admit 
evidence about the donor’s political views and beliefs (as an essential element of the offence) 
and uphold his conviction irrespective what intent promoted the donation. This evidentiary 
problem indicates that even the imposition of a motive requirement does not guarantee that 
the offence would not sweep together both guilty and non-guilty mental states. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the theory that terrorism (similar to organized crimes and money laundering) 
could also be hindered by the adoption of a comprehensive and global system of mechanisms 
against its financing, a call for the creation of a new convention on terrorist financing was 
made. As a result, the Terrorist Financing Convention was adopted, obliging States parties  to 
regard the preparatory act of financing as an independent offence of terrorist financing. 
However, examination of the Convention’s criminalization provisions has shown that the 
definition of the offence is far too vague and in many respects, inconsistent with the 
traditional principles of criminal law, as summarised as follows: 
1- The Convention does not provide a solid platform for a better understanding of 
terrorism, the financing of which it obliges States to criminalize. Its definition of terrorism 
does not really take into account the underlying problem which hampers reaching an 
international agreement on a convention on terrorism: the distinction between terrorism and 
other forms of armed conflict. It has failed to define terrorist groups. It has not addressed 
what constitutes ‘terrorist purposes’ or ‘terrorist activities’ while it refers to them.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
408Roach, supra note 331. While  Roach  disagrees with the idea that the mental element of terrorist offences 
should be  defined with a vague reference to a “political and religious motive requirement ... because of its 
potentially harmful effects on those who may share political and religious beliefs with terrorists and on its 
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the balance between its probative value and prejudice” (at 271),  he does not found it unsupportable and unfair 
to define terrorism offences with an implicit reference to the intention of intimidating the public or coercing a 
state or an organization. He argues that in comparison with the political and religious motive requirement 
according to which courts need to face “the difficulty of determining and judging the true nature of a person’s 
religious beliefs, or the sincerity of their expression”,  the intent of intimidation and coercion are “easy to 
determine and judge” and deserve less constitutional protection (at 292-3).           
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2- The Convention provides a broad definition of ‘funds’ which seems to include almost 
anything under the sun. This definition proves to be controversial when it is applied at 
national levels (for example, in the US’s definition of funds). The definition of the term 
‘funds’ also varies considerably from one State to another.  
3- The Convention’s definition of the objective elements of the offence raises serious 
issues of clarity and certainty. Acts of financing, according to the Convention, include acts of 
collection and provision. Controversy has arisen over whether the act of collection is 
perquisite to the act of provision, or there are two different, but successive offences? 
Different approaches have been adopted by States. 
3- The offence is heavily reliant on poorly-defined and ambiguous fault elements 
(knowledge and intention). To establish an independent offence, the Convention does not 
require the act of financing to be linked to any terrorist act. But in the absence of preparation 
or commission of a terrorist act, the Convention has not clarified what a financer needs to 
know or intend, in order to be criminally liable. The mental elements of the offence have 
been examined in two circumstances within which acts of financing may take place: 
financing of a terrorist act and financing of a terrorist group. 
With regard to the former, by analysing the Australian case of Lodhi and the Canadian 
case of Khawaja, it has been illustrated that when the financing is involved in collection or 
possession of funds for the commission or preparation of a terrorist act, any mental 
requirements other than actual intention and knowledge as to the subsequent offence would 
significantly expand the concept of criminal responsibility beyond the traditional inchoate 
offences; it might impose liability on the innocent, on people who are remotely and indirectly 
are linked to a terrorist act, or people with an unclear criminal intent. It might also result in an 
unfair and unjustifiable reversal of the burden of proof. However, a requirement of proof of 
an actual intention or awareness as to the subsequent terrorist act would limit the crime of 
financing to the equivalent of inchoate offences, which is not supported by the Convention 
and the FATF.  
With regard to the financing of terrorist groups, different alternative fault elements have 
been tested. It has been illustrated that mere knowledge of the identity of the recipient of 
funds would not suffice for the offence as it sweeps up both guilty and non-guilty mental 
states into the scope of liability. It also imposes liability on well-intention financers who seek 
to provide resources to non-violent humanitarian and political activities of a group. Multiple 
legal challenges would also target any higher intent requirements (recklessness or specific 
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intent), including arguments based on vagueness, overbreadth and the requirement of the 
presumption of innocence. This is because, in the absence of commission of any terrorist act, 
a financer should have “terrorist purposes”; but the term ‘terrorist purposes’ has not been 
defined. It has been argued that the application of terrorist purposes as a mental requirement 
could result in the creation of a whole new class of political crimes. 
